Conviction unsustainable where FIR is coerced and victim fails to specify acts of sexual assault.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the FIR and subsequent prosecution were initiated voluntarily or under external coercion and pressure

The court held

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. It held that when the foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault under Section 5(l) are not established, a conviction under Section 6 cannot be sustained

It also directed

The Court acquitted the Appellant of all charges, ordered the discharge of his bail bonds, and directed the return of the Trial Court record

01Facts

The Appellant was convicted by the Special Judge (POCSO), Karbi Anglong, under Section 6 of the POCSO Act for the alleged sexual assault of a 14-year-old minor

p. 3

The prosecution’s case was based on an FIR lodged by the victim’s mother (PW2) alleging two instances of assault and blackmail

p. 3

During the trial, the victim (PW1) and her mother (PW2) admitted that the FIR was lodged under coercion and threats from a religious group, rather than free will

p. 4, 7, 8

The victim also refused a medical examination

p. 4, 9

The Trial Court convicted the appellant primarily based on the victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the failure of the defense to shake the credibility of PW1

p. 6

02Issues

i.1. Whether the FIR and subsequent prosecution were initiated voluntarily or under external coercion and pressure

p. 4, 8

ii.2. Whether the term "physical relationship" in the victim's testimony, without specific details of the act, is sufficient to constitute "penetrative sexual assault" under Section 6 of the POCSO Act

p. 9, 10

iii.3. Whether statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. constitute substantive evidence for conviction if not corroborated by oral testimony or put to the accused during Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination

p. 10

03Law Applied

The court applied Section 6 and Section 7 of the POCSO Act, 2012, which distinguish between "penetrative sexual assault" and "sexual assault" based on specific physical acts and intent

p. 9

The court relied on the evidentiary principle that statements made under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. are not substantive evidence but can only be used for corroboration or contradiction

p. 10

The court emphasized Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., which mandates that incriminating circumstances must be put to the accused to be used against them

p. 10

Provisions in the judgment · 6 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 164 Section 313 Section 374

04Reasoning

The High Court found that the foundational facts for a conviction under Section 6 were not established. It noted that the victim and informant (PW1 and PW2) explicitly testified that the case was filed due to the "pressure of a religious group" and that they did not know the contents of the English-written FIR

p. 7, 8

The Court observed that the victim’s testimony regarding a "physical relationship" lacked any description of a sexual act, penetration, or contact with specific body parts as required by Sections 5 and 7 of the POCSO Act

p. 9, 10

Critically, the Court held that the Trial Judge erred by treating the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement as substantive evidence, especially since those specific allegations were never put to the Appellant during his Section 313 examination, thereby violating the principles of a fair trial

p. 10