Correction of date of birth in service records at the fag end of career is legally unsustainable.

The petitioner was appointed as a Beldar (daily wager) in the respondent department on April 1, 1980

At the time of induction, his date of birth (DOB) was recorded in the service records as December 9, 1950, based on particulars provided by the petitioner himself

The petitioner retired from service on December 31, 2012

Five years post-retirement, in 2017, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking a correction of his DOB to January 10, 1962, based on a medical examination conducted on January 1, 2013

The petitioner contended that as an uneducated Class-IV employee, he was unaware of the recorded error or his legal remedies earlier

1. Whether a government servant is entitled to seek the correction of their date of birth in service records at the "fag end" of their career or after retirement

2. Whether the delay of over three decades in challenging the recorded date of birth constitutes laches, rendering the petition barred

3. Whether Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code allows for the revision of a declaration of age several decades after induction into service

The court primarily applied Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code, which stipulates that the date of birth recorded at the time of appointment is deemed absolutely conclusive and cannot be revised later except in cases of clerical error

The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v. M.C. Subramaniam Reddy (2021), which held that applications for DOB correction can be rejected on grounds of delay and laches, particularly when made at the fag end of service

It further applied principles from State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas (2011), emphasizing that courts must be circumspect in correcting DOB records near superannuation to prevent "chain reactions" affecting the seniority and promotion of other employees

The court found that the petitioner had personally filled his employment particulars in 1980, including the DOB of December 9, 1950; therefore, he could not be permitted to "take a U-turn" decades later

Applying the M.P. Financial Code, the court noted that the recorded DOB constitutes conclusive proof and the petitioner failed to prove that the entry resulted from a clerical error by the department rather than his own declaration

Regarding the timing, the court observed a 32-year delay between the induction into service (1980) and the filing of the petition (2017)

The court reasoned that the petitioner "slept over his rights" and that his lack of education did not justify the extraordinary delay

The court emphasized that even if cogent evidence (such as a medical report) exists, correction cannot be claimed as a matter of right at the end of a career because it disrupts administrative stability and the rights of other employees

The court held that a request for change of DOB at the fag end of service or after retirement is not permissible under law, especially when the employee had originally verified the service record particulars

No costs were awarded