Corroborated oral dying declarations can sustain conviction even without eyewitness testimony.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant raped and injured the informant’s wife on 29 March 2016.

She disclosed the incident to her husband and brother, was taken for treatment, and died.

The post-mortem attributed death to haemorrhagic shock caused by an incised vaginal wound.

There were no eyewitnesses; the prosecution relied principally on the oral disclosure made by the deceased to the informant and his brother.

The Sessions Court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 376 IPC and imposed life imprisonment for each offence, with the sentences to run concurrently.

The appellant challenged the conviction, including on the grounds that the disclosure was insufficiently corroborated and that the post-mortem timing contradicted the alleged date of occurrence.

1. Whether the oral disclosure made by the deceased to the informant and his brother, considered with the medical evidence, was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s convictions under Sections 302 and 376 IPC.

2. Whether the post-mortem estimate of time since death undermined the prosecution’s account of the occurrence.

The appeal concerned the offences of rape and murder under Sections 376 and 302 IPC.

In assessing the medical evidence, the Court applied the principle that a post-mortem estimate of time since death is approximate and cannot ordinarily fix the exact time of death with mathematical precision.

It relied on Maxi Soreng @ Maxi v. State of Odisha, 2024 SCC OnLine Ori 252, which discusses that principle, including the authorities State v. Arup Pradhan, 1985 Cri LJ 161; Pattipati Venkaiah v. State of A.P., (1985) 4 SCC 80; and Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204.

The Court treated the deceased’s disclosure to the informant and his brother as consistent, and found that the post-mortem findings of a severe incised vaginal wound corroborated the account of the assault.

It accepted that the post-mortem report’s date, recorded as 4 January 2016, was an error because the doctor’s evidence established that the examination occurred on 1 April 2016.

On that basis, the estimated time of death—24 to 48 hours before the examination—was consistent with the inquest evidence that death occurred on 31 March 2016, and did not disprove the alleged occurrence on 29 March.

The Court also considered the delay in reporting explained by the appellant’s relationship to the informant and found the defence evidence of false implication insufficient to displace the prosecution case.

The convictions and sentences under Sections 302 and 376 IPC, including concurrent life sentences and fines, therefore remained undisturbed.