Counsel negligence alone, without litigant diligence, is not sufficient cause under Order IX Rule 13.

The Respondent obtained an ex parte decree against the Appellants for ₹23,00,000, with interest and costs, after the Appellants—who had been served with summons—failed to file a written statement or appear in the suit

The Appellants said they learned of the decree when execution proceedings reached them in September 2025.

They filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, relying on their former counsel’s alleged failures and the death of Appellant No. 2’s brother.

The Commercial Court dismissed the applications as time-barred and found no sufficient cause for non-appearance.

The Appellants appealed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Order XLIII Rule 1(d) CPC.

Whether the Appellants established sufficient cause under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for their failure to appear when the suit proceeded ex parte.

Whether the Appellants established grounds to condone the delay in applying to set aside the ex parte decree, including whether limitation ran from the date of the decree or their asserted date of knowledge.

Under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, an ex parte decree may be set aside if summons were not duly served or the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing; where summons were duly served, the second proviso bars setting aside the decree merely for irregularity in service if the defendant had notice of the hearing date and sufficient time to appear.

“Sufficient cause” is assessed contextually and requires the court to consider whether the defendant acted bona fide and diligently; it is not established by a bare assertion of counsel’s default.

The Court relied on *Parimal v. Veena*, *G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada*, and *Hira Sweets & Confectionary Private Ltd. v. Hira Confectioners* on the meaning and application of sufficient cause.

It also considered the principle in *Rafiq v. Munshilal* that a litigant should not ordinarily suffer for counsel’s fault, while holding that the principle does not displace the requirement of the litigant’s own bona fide conduct and reasonable diligence.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation of delay where sufficient cause is shown; the Court held that, given due service, limitation was to be reckoned from the date of the decree rather than the asserted date of knowledge.

The Court found that the brother’s death, though a serious personal tragedy, did not explain the Appellants’ continued absence over the months following the event, including their failure to appear after being proceeded ex parte.

The allegations that counsel had repeatedly assured them the case was being handled were unsupported by particulars or evidence, and the later complaint against counsel did not establish sufficient cause for the earlier defaults.

Although the Appellants took steps after learning of the decree, those steps did not explain why they failed to pursue the Order IX Rule 13 remedy sooner; in any event, due service meant limitation ran from the decree date.

The Court therefore concluded that neither sufficient cause for non-appearance nor an adequate explanation for delay had been shown.

It found no error in the Commercial Court’s dismissal of the applications, dismissed the appeal, disposed of the pending applications, and made no order as to costs.