Counsel’s personal inability cannot justify condonation of an unexplained delay in refiling.

The Appellant, acting as liquidator of M/s Brown Packaging Systems Pvt. Ltd., challenged the NCLT Mumbai Bench’s order dated 8 December 2025, which partly allowed his application for remuneration and granted ₹4,00,000 plus GST, in addition to the amount payable under Regulation 4 of the IBBI Liquidation Regulations

The appeal was e-filed on 10 January 2026. The Registry identified defects on 16 January 2026, but the defects were only partially rectified when the appeal was refiled on 28 May 2026. Further defects were notified on 29 June 2026 and 7 August 2026, but remained uncured, resulting in a reported delay of 202 days in refiling

The Appellant filed I.A. No. 6046 of 2026 seeking condonation of the refiling delay. The explanation relied on the medical condition of the Advocate-on-Record’s 75-year-old mother, who required cancer treatment and intensive medical care

The application was supported by an affidavit from the counsel rather than from the Appellant himself

Whether the delay of 202 days in refiling the Company Appeal should be condoned on the ground that the Advocate-on-Record was attending to his ailing mother?

Whether the counsel’s personal inability could constitute sufficient cause for the Appellant’s failure to rectify Registry defects within the time contemplated under Rule 26 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016?

Whether the absence of an independent application or affidavit from the Appellant explaining the delay justified rejection of the condonation application?

The Tribunal applied Rule 26(2)–(4) of the NCLAT Rules, 2016, under which Registry defects must ordinarily be rectified within seven days; the Registrar may grant further time for sufficient cause, and may decline to register an appeal where the party fails to remove the defects within the prescribed or extended period

The Tribunal also considered the procedural requirements governing appeals under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013, including the need for diligence in prosecuting an appeal

It further applied the principle that a litigant must independently explain delay and cannot ordinarily rely solely on the personal difficulties of counsel, particularly where the defects are ministerial and could have been rectified by the litigant or another counsel

The Tribunal held that the explanation did not account for the entire period of delay. The first defect notice was issued on 16 January 2026, whereas the counsel’s mother’s treatment commenced only on 9 February 2026, leaving an unexplained intervening period

Even during the treatment schedule, there were sufficient intervals in which the Appellant could have coordinated with counsel, engaged another counsel, or personally undertaken the ministerial task of curing the defects

The Appellant, himself being a liquidator familiar with tribunal procedure, had not shown any independent diligence or personal inability to comply with the Registry’s directions

Since the condonation request was supported only by counsel’s affidavit and no independent application or affidavit was filed by the Appellant, the Tribunal found the 202-day delay to be inordinate and unexplained. Counsel’s personal difficulties could not be treated as the Appellant’s sufficient cause under Rule 26

Consequently, the Company Appeal (AT) No. 326 of 2026 was dismissed without examination of the Appellant’s substantive challenge concerning liquidator’s remuneration