Court cannot reappreciate evidence or factual findings while exercising limited jurisdiction under Section 37.

The appellant, a co-operative society, entered into an agreement with the respondent during the 2013-14 procurement year for the supply and transportation of wheat.

The appellant claimed that despite supplying 68339.09 quintals, the respondent failed to pay an outstanding amount of ₹12,26,410/-. Consequently, the appellant initiated proceedings before the Collector, Harda, acting as the Arbitrator.

On 13.02.2020, the Collector dismissed the claim, citing discrepancies in supply records and the appellant's failure to provide cogent evidence regarding the alleged shortage.

The appellant challenged this under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Principal District Judge, Harda, who dismissed the application on 30.06.2022, holding that the grounds urged required an impermissible reappreciation of evidence.

1. Whether the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, permits the High Court to reappreciate evidence or substitute the Arbitrator's view with its own?

2. Whether the lower court’s order under Section 34 suffered from any patent legal infirmity or contravened the fundamental policy of Indian law?

Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which restricts appellate interference to the grounds mentioned in Section 34.

McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., establishing that the court's supervisory role is minimal and intended only to ensure fairness, not to correct arbitral errors.

MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited, which mandates that Section 37 courts must be "extremely cautious" in disturbing concurrent findings of the Arbitrator and the Section 34 court.

Dyna Technology Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. was cited to emphasize that awards should not be interfered with unless perversity goes to the "root of the matter".

The High Court observed that the appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, irregularity, or illegality in the arbitral award or the subsequent Section 34 order.

The court reasoned that under Section 37, it cannot act as a regular court of appeal to re-examine factual findings or the sufficiency of evidence, as the Collector (Arbitrator) had already scrutinized the procurement documents, weighment receipts, and correspondence.

The court noted that even if two views are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator must prevail if it is one a reasonable person could take.

Since the appellant merely sought a reappreciation of facts—which is prohibited under the settled legal framework—the court found no grounds for intervention.

The court affirmed that the concurrent findings of the Arbitrator and the Commercial Court were in consonance with the Act's scheme and not against public policy. Consequently, the Arbitration Appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.