Court may extend mandate under Section 29A(5) even after award pronouncement if sufficient cause exists.

The Petitioner was awarded a contract for security services by the Respondent. Following disputes, arbitration was invoked under the aegis of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC).

The High Court had extended the arbitrator's mandate until 01.11.2024. Due to Diwali holidays between 31.10.2024 and 03.11.2024, the arbitrator pronounced the award on 04.11.2024.

The Respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the Act"), alleging it was passed after the mandate expired. The Petitioner subsequently filed an application under Section 29A seeking a retrospective extension.

While the High Court initially dismissed the Section 29A petition and set aside the award, the Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No. 2346-47 of 2026, set aside those orders and restored the Section 29A application for fresh consideration in light of the C. Velusamy precedent.

1. Whether a court has the power to extend the mandate of an arbitrator under Section 29A(5) of the Act after the award has already been pronounced.

2. Whether the intervening public holidays, causing a delay in the pronouncement of an award prepared within the mandate, constitute "sufficient cause" for extension.

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which governs the time limit for arbitral awards and the court's power to extend the mandate.

The Supreme Court precedent C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera (2026 INSC 112), which established that an application under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the mandate and after the rendering of an award.

The principle that technicalities should not defeat substantial justice.

Standards of "sufficient cause" as distinguished from cases like Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh and Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.

The court reasoned that since the award was to be pronounced at the DIAC premises, which were closed for Diwali holidays from 31.10.2024 to 03.11.2024, the arbitrator could not physically pronounce the award before the 01.11.2024 deadline.

The court held that this did not constitute "intentional inaction" by the Petitioner.

Applying C. Velusamy, the court clarified that the power to extend the mandate is not impaired by the fact that the award is already rendered; rather, the extension "validates" the otherwise unenforceable award by allowing the mandate to cover the date of pronouncement.

The court rejected the Respondent’s argument that the Petitioner was a "fence sitter," noting that Section 29A(5) prescribes no limitation period and grants either party the right to seek an extension regardless of the outcome of the proceedings.

The court allowed the application under Section 29A, granting the extension of the mandate up to the date of pronouncement (04.11.2024) and ruled that no reduction in arbitrator fees or substitution of the tribunal was necessary.