Courts cannot interfere with administrative transfers absent mala fides or statutory violation.

The appellant, a Lab Technician, was promoted and posted on 15 March 2024 at Ramanuj Pratap Singhdev Shaskiya Snatakottar Mahavidyalaya, Baikunthpur, District Koriya, a Scheduled Area.

By transfer order dated 4 July 2025, he was transferred to Navin Shaskiya Mahavidyalaya, Bortara, District Bemetara, a Non-Scheduled Area.

He challenged the transfer in W.P.(S) No. 7860 of 2025, where the High Court stayed the transfer and directed him to submit a representation to the Transfer Committee.

The Committee rejected or declined to grant relief on 7 October 2025.

The appellant asserted that the transfer violated Clauses 1.8, 3.4, 3.7 and 3.10 of the Transfer Policy, 2025, as it was premature, involved transfer from a Scheduled to a Non-Scheduled Area, and was not accompanied by posting of a substitute.

He also relied on his 60% permanent disability, family responsibilities, dependent parents, non-earning wife and children studying at Baikunthpur.

The learned Single Judge dismissed W.P.(S) No. 162 of 2026 on 9 January 2026, holding that transfer was an incident of service, that the appellant had not established mala fides or violation of a mandatory statutory provision, and that the Transfer Policy was not statutory in nature.

However, the respondents were directed to maintain the status quo regarding his posting until 31 March 2026 because his children’s examinations were approaching and he had not yet been relieved.

The appellant thereafter filed the present writ appeal with a delay of 140 days and sought condonation of delay.

Whether the learned Single Judge erred in declining to interfere with the appellant’s transfer despite his asserted 60% permanent disability, alleged premature transfer from a Scheduled Area to a Non-Scheduled Area, and claimed non-compliance with the Transfer Policy, 2025.

Whether the transfer order or the Transfer Committee’s decision was vitiated by mala fides, violation of any mandatory statutory provision, perversity, or patent illegality warranting interference in writ jurisdiction.

Whether the appellant furnished sufficient and satisfactory grounds for condoning the 140-day delay in filing the writ appeal.

Transfer of a government servant holding a transferable post is an ordinary incident of service, and the employee has no vested right to remain posted at a particular place.

Judicial interference is ordinarily justified only where the transfer is vitiated by mala fides or violates a statutory provision.

The Court relied on Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, 1989 AIR 1433, Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2007) 8 SCC 150, Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 15 SCC 178, and Namrata Verma v. State of U.P., SLP (C) No. 36717 of 2017, decided on 6 September 2021, for these principles.

A transfer policy ordinarily does not confer an enforceable statutory right unless incorporated into a statutory rule; administrative authorities retain discretion to transfer employees in the interest of administration.

In an intra-court appeal, interference is warranted only where the Single Judge’s order discloses a palpable infirmity, patent illegality, perversity, or other compelling error.

Personal hardship, including the non-availability of a particular school for an employee’s children, ordinarily does not invalidate an otherwise lawful transfer.

The Court held that the learned Single Judge had considered the appellant’s principal grounds, including his disability, family circumstances, tenure at Baikunthpur, alleged breach of the Transfer Policy, and the educational needs of his children.

The appellant had not established that the transfer was motivated by mala fides or that it violated any mandatory statutory provision.

The alleged breach of the Transfer Policy could not, by itself, justify judicial interference because the policy was not statutory and did not create an enforceable right to remain at a particular posting.

The appellant’s disability and personal hardship were relevant circumstances but did not demonstrate that the transfer was legally invalid.

The Court further found no palpable infirmity, perversity, patent illegality or non-application of mind in the Single Judge’s order or in the Transfer Committee’s decision.

Since the appellant also failed to provide a sufficient and satisfactory explanation for the 140-day delay, the application for condonation was not sustainable.

The application for condonation of the 140-day delay was also rejected for want of a sufficient explanation.

No order as to costs was made.