Courts cannot interfere with tender eligibility criteria absent proven arbitrariness, mala fides, or bias.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the tender conditions prescribing a ₹100 Crore turnover and prohibiting consortiums are arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of the principle of a "level playing field" under Article 14 of the Constitution

The court held

The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the impugned tender conditions were neither arbitrary nor discriminatory

It also directed

It ruled that eligibility criteria cannot be modified by the Court to suit a particular bidder’s circumstances, especially when the conditions are based on the upgraded technical and logistical demands of conducting a large-scale election

All connected interim applications were closed

01Facts

The petitioner, a company providing election webcasting services, challenged the eligibility criteria in an e-tender dated 03.03.2026 issued by the Additional Chief Electoral Officer for live webcasting and recording during the 2026 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Elections

¶ 1, 2.1

The petitioner specifically contested two conditions: (i) the requirement for an average annual turnover of ₹100 Crores over the last three financial years, and (ii) the prohibition of participation through Joint Ventures or Consortiums

¶ 2.2, 6

The petitioner alleged these conditions were arbitrary, disproportionate, and "tailor-made" to exclude technically competent MSMEs while favoring a limited number of large entities

¶ 2.2, 3.3

The respondents justified the criteria citing a substantial increase in the scale of work—from 45,000 polling stations in 2024 to approximately 75,032 stations requiring two cameras each and over 75,000 personnel—necessitating high financial capacity and independent execution to avoid delays caused by consortium disputes

¶ 4.1, 4.2, 4.3

02Issues

i.1. Whether the tender conditions prescribing a ₹100 Crore turnover and prohibiting consortiums are arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of the principle of a "level playing field" under Article 14 of the Constitution

¶ 3.1, 7

ii.2. Whether the Court can exercise judicial review to modify or rationalise tender eligibility criteria set by the executive based on administrative and technical requirements

¶ 11, 15

03Law Applied

The terms of a tender are in the realm of contract and not open to judicial scrutiny unless the decision is reached arbitrarily, with mala fides, or is hit by Wednesbury unreasonableness (Tata Cellular v. Union of India)

¶ 8

The State must be allowed "greater latitude" and "play in the joints" to set preconditions ensuring a contractor’s capacity (Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka)

¶ 9

The Court cannot strike down terms merely because it feels alternative terms would be fairer or more logical (Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd.)

¶ 10

04Reasoning

The Court observed that the scale of the current election project was significantly larger than previous years, requiring the installation of nearly 1,50,000 cameras and the mobilization of 75,032 personnel across the state

¶ 12, 13

Consequently, the high turnover requirement was found to have a rational nexus with the bidder's capacity to procure and install equipment at short notice

¶ 13

Regarding the consortium ban, the Court accepted the respondent’s reasoning that the sensitive, time-bound nature of election activities necessitates a single point of accountability to prevent delays arising from internal partner disputes

¶ 14

The Court noted that the petitioner failed to provide material evidence of perversity, bias, or mala fides

¶ 15

It reasoned that the tender-floating authority is the "best judge" of its own requirements and possesses the necessary technical and administrative expertise to frame such conditions

¶ 11, 16