Courts cannot reappraise APAR gradings absent procedural illegality, arbitrariness, or proven bias.

The applicant’s APAR gradings for 2006–07 and 2007–08 were recorded as “Good”, below the “Very Good” benchmark prescribed for promotion.

The APARs were communicated to him on 29 April 2013, following which he made several representations seeking upgradation; those representations were rejected at various stages between 2013 and 2018.

After the ICAR’s instructions dated 19 June 2018 permitting direct representations to the concerned Deputy Director General, the applicant submitted a further representation, which was rejected by order dated 25/28 June 2019.

He consequently filed the present OA seeking quashing of that order and expunction or reconsideration of the impugned APAR gradings.

The applicant alleged bias and tampering by the reporting officer, contended that the APARs were assessed on or near the date of submission and beyond the prescribed time, and argued that the competent authority improperly relied upon the comments of the reporting officer while disregarding his achievements.

The respondents maintained that the grading of “Good” was an unbiased assessment, that the correction in the APAR was merely a signed correction of a slip of the pen, and that the applicant had himself submitted the 2006–07 APAR late.

1. Whether the applicant established that the reporting and reviewing officers were biased against him or that the 2006–07 APAR had been improperly tampered with, warranting judicial interference?

2. Whether the APARs were liable to be expunged merely because they were assessed on the date of, or shortly after, their submission?

3. Whether the APARs were invalid because the assessments were made after 30 June of the relevant year?

4. Whether the Deputy Director General acted unlawfully by obtaining and considering the comments of the reporting and reviewing officers while deciding the applicant’s representation?

5. Whether the applicant was entitled to upgradation or expunction of the “Good” APAR gradings for 2006–07 and 2007–08?

The Tribunal applied the principle that judicial review of an APAR assessment is limited to examining the legality and fairness of the decision-making process; a court or tribunal should not act as an appellate authority or substitute its own assessment for that of the administrative authority possessing the relevant expertise.

This principle was drawn from Manudev Dahiya v. Union of India through DG ITBP, W.P. (C) No. 2673/2016, relying upon Swapan Kumar Pal v. Achintya Kumar Nayak, (2008) 1 SCC 379.

The Tribunal further applied the rule that allegations of bias or mala fides must be supported by credible evidence and cannot be founded on mere assertions.

Under ICAR’s instructions dated 19 June 2018, the concerned SMD/DDG may obtain comments from the reporting and reviewing officers before deciding a representation against an APAR, in accordance with the applicable DoPT and ICAR instructions.

The Tribunal also treated timely and reasoned administrative assessment as sufficient where no rule prohibited assessment on the date of submission or shortly thereafter.

The Tribunal held that the applicant failed to produce credible evidence of prejudice, mala fides, mental incapacity of the reporting officer, or unlawful tampering.

The correction from “Very Good” to “Good” was explained by the respondents as a signed correction of a slip of the pen, and the competent authority’s subsequent confirmation of the gradings did not support the allegation of bias.

The fact that the 2006–07 APAR was assessed on the date of submission and the 2007–08 APAR two days thereafter did not invalidate them, since no rule prohibited such prompt assessment and the reporting officer was expected to avoid undue delay.

The challenge based on the 30 June deadline also failed: the applicant himself submitted the 2006–07 APAR on 29 August 2007, while the 2007–08 APAR was assessed before 30 June 2008.

The Tribunal further found that the Deputy Director General had considered the applicant’s work, the gradings of the reporting and reviewing officers, and the subsequent comments of the reporting officer.

Obtaining such comments was expressly permissible under the ICAR instructions and did not violate procedural fairness.

Since the authority concluded that the applicant had not identified any specific achievement or significant contribution justifying upgradation, the Tribunal declined to reassess the merits of that administrative conclusion within the limited scope of judicial review.

It held that the allegations of bias, tampering, procedural irregularity, delayed assessment, and improper consideration of the reporting officer’s comments were unsubstantiated.

The order dated 25/28 June 2019 upholding the “Good” gradings for 2006–07 and 2007–08 was therefore not unlawful or amenable to judicial interference.

The OA was dismissed as devoid of merit; the associated MAs were disposed of, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.