Courts may condone short, bona fide delays in applications to set aside ex parte decrees.

The trial court passed an ex parte judgment and decree on 26 September 2025.

The respondent sought to set it aside under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, stating that it learned of the decree on 11 November 2025 and explaining the subsequent administrative steps and court holidays that led to the application being filed on 5 January 2026.

The Civil Judge condoned the delay, and the Sixth District Judge affirmed that order. The petitioner challenged the affirmance in this civil revision.

Whether the respondent showed sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the delay in filing its Order IX Rule 13 CPC application

Whether the courts below erred in condoning the delay so as to warrant interference under Section 115 CPC

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation of delay where sufficient cause is shown; the expression is to be construed liberally to advance substantial justice, while accounting for whether negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides is attributable to the party.

The Court relied on Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, and S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through LRs v. Narasamma (Dead) through LRs, (2013) 11 SCC 341, for those principles.

The Court stated that an application to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree must be brought within 30 days from the date of knowledge.

Section 115 CPC governs the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction.

Although the respondent did not disclose the source of its knowledge of the decree on 11 November 2025, the petitioner produced no material showing that the respondent knew of it earlier. The Court therefore considered the explanation bona fide.

It also took account of the department’s procedural steps to appoint an officer-in-charge, the subsequent instruction to counsel, and the court closures, and noted that the delay was short—about 14 days from the date of knowledge.

Applying the liberal approach to “sufficient cause” and balancing the parties’ interests, the Court found the lower courts’ decision reasonable and saw no basis for revisional interference.