Courts may mould and grant monetary relief under a general prayer clause to ensure substantive equity.

The Respondents (Kamaliya Brothers) owned a luxury hotel in Rajkot and sought to develop it into a shopping center and apartments.

Due to a financial crunch, they entered into an agreement dated 13.04.1983 with the Appellants (Star Land Developers) to complete the construction.

The Appellants agreed to pay Rs. 15,49,840 to the Respondents and construct specific areas for them in exchange for development rights.

An irrevocable Power of Attorney (POA) was executed in favor of the Appellants' partner.

Disputes led to cross-suits: the Appellants sought to prevent revocation of the POA (RCS No. 1296/1984), and the Respondents sought a declaration that the POA was revoked and an injunction against further construction due to breach of contract (RCS No. 1297/1984).

The trial court decreed the Appellants' suit and dismissed the Respondents' suit.

On appeal, the First Appellate Court partly modified the decree in RCS No. 1297/1984, directing the Appellants to pay Rs. 2,74,840 with 9% interest, representing the outstanding balance of the agreement and proceeds from an unauthorized shop sale.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in granting a money decree for Rs. 2,74,840 when the original pleadings were restricted to declaration and injunction.

2. Whether a court can grant a decree for payment without specific prayers, amendments, or pleadings regarding subsequent events.

3. Whether the scope of Section 100 of the CPC permits interference with the Appellate Court's exercise of equity.

The court primarily applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, which restricts the High Court’s jurisdiction in second appeals to substantial questions of law.

It addressed the doctrine that "one cannot blow hot and cold" (equitable estoppel), where a party cannot claim benefits under a contract while repudiating its obligations.

The court further relied on the principle of "moulding of relief," allowing a court to grant necessary relief under a general prayer ("To grant any necessary relief") to balance equity between parties.

It considered precedents like Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa regarding the limits of S. 100 and the necessity of justice according to law.

The High Court observed that the Appellants’ success in their own suit (RCS No. 1296/1984) was based on the validity of the Agreement (Exh-48) and POA (Exh-49).

However, the Appellant-partner admitted in his deposition that he had only paid Rs. 14,00,000 out of the agreed Rs. 15,49,840, leaving an outstanding balance of Rs. 1,49,840.

Furthermore, the Appellants constructed and sold an additional shop (the 9th shop) without permission and outside the original plan, receiving Rs. 1,25,000.

The High Court rejected the Appellants' argument that the money decree was outside the pleadings, noting that the Respondents had included a general prayer for "any necessary relief" (Relief No. 5).

The court reasoned that since the Appellants took the fullest benefit of the agreement to secure their rights, they were equitably bound to pay the consideration admitted as outstanding.

It held that the First Appellate Court was justified in moulding the relief to ensure justice and equity, even in the absence of a specific money claim, given the admissions made during the trial and the general prayer in the suit.

The court found that no substantial question of law arose, as the findings were based on facts and the principle of fair play.

The interim relief was discontinued, and the direction to pay Rs. 2,74,840 with 9% interest was upheld.