Courts may restrict successive foreign-travel applications during trial, subject to exceptional circumstances.

The petitioner challenged paragraph 7(l) of the Special Judge, CBI’s order dated 9 September 2026, which permitted him to travel to Istanbul and Paris but restricted him from making a similar travel application for six months, except in “exceptional and compelling circumstances”.

The petitioner had previously travelled abroad, including to Istanbul in July 2026, and stated that he had complied with the conditions imposed on earlier permissions.

His challenge was confined to the six-month restriction; the travel permitted by the order had already taken place.

1. Whether the six-month restriction on making a further foreign-travel application, subject to an exception for “exceptional and compelling circumstances,” impermissibly infringed the petitioner’s right to travel abroad under Article 21 of the Constitution.

2. Whether the Trial Court could impose that limited restriction to regulate repeated travel requests and safeguard the orderly progress of pending criminal proceedings.

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, was invoked as the basis for the petition.

The right to travel abroad is a facet of personal liberty under Article 21, but it is not absolute and must be balanced against the right to a speedy trial and the effective administration of criminal justice.

In Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1071, the Supreme Court recognised that this balance may take account of the accused’s conduct and the interests of the trial and society.

The Court also referred to Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI for the principle that individual liberty may be subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of society.

Satish Chandra Verma v. Union of India, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 2048, supports the proposition that foreign travel is an important facet of personal liberty; Sumer Singh Salkan v. Assistant Director, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2699, does not confine the Court’s power to regulate travel solely to concerns about flight risk or evasion.

The Court treated the impugned condition as a limited regulation of successive travel applications, not an absolute prohibition on foreign travel: the Trial Court retained jurisdiction to consider a further request where exceptional and compelling circumstances were shown.

The petitioner’s past compliance was relevant but did not create an indefeasible right to travel abroad at successive intervals, particularly given the grave economic-offence allegations and the need to ensure the orderly progress of the trial.

The condition was also considered in the context of the travel permission granted and the other safeguards imposed, including a requirement to return on the specified date and not delay the trial.

Any future application would remain for the Trial Court to decide on its merits.

It dismissed the petition, while clarifying that the petitioner could approach the Trial Court during the stipulated period with any circumstances said to warrant foreign travel; that application must be considered in accordance with law and on its merits.