Courts must adopt a liberal approach to condoning delay where medical incapacity plausibly explains it.

The petitioner’s complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, concerning a cheque for ₹10,00,000, resulted in the respondent’s acquittal on 7 October 2025.

The petitioner filed a criminal appeal with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of approximately six months’ delay.

He attributed the delay to a ligament tear, hospitalization and depression, and produced a medical certificate dated 4 April 2026.

The appellate court dismissed the application because the certificate did not establish incapacity throughout the delay and the application did not specify the exact number of delayed days; it consequently dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

The petitioner challenged that order in revision.

1. Whether the appellate court adopted an unduly rigid approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay despite the petitioner’s stated medical circumstances and supporting certificate.

2. Whether the refusal to condone the delay warranted interference in revision and restoration of the appeal for decision on its merits.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation where “sufficient cause” is shown; that expression is to be applied meaningfully and liberally to advance substantial justice, rather than through a pedantic or hyper-technical approach.

The Court relied on Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123; and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, for the principle that delay may be condoned where the explanation is bona fide and negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is not attributable to the applicant.

The Court also stated that revisional power under Section 438 of the BNSS is exercised sparingly, including where material irregularity or failure of justice is shown.

The petitioner gave a specific medical explanation and supported it with a certificate from a qualified medical practitioner.

Although the certificate did not account for every day of the delay, the appellate court should not have rejected it mechanically or treated the absence of an exact calculation as determinative.

The record disclosed no indication that the delay was deliberate or arose from negligence or lack of bona fides.

In the High Court’s view, dismissing the appeal on limitation through a hyper-technical approach risked defeating substantial justice and constituted a failure of justice warranting revisional interference.

It directed restoration of MJCR No. 182/2026 to its original number and required the appellate court to decide the appeal on its merits after hearing both parties, preferably within three months of receiving the certified copy of the order.

No order as to costs was made.