Time spent pursuing mutation proceedings is not excludable under Section 14 for an adoption challenge.

The plaintiffs, descendants of Umesh Chandra Mondal, sought a declaration that Braj Nandan Mondal’s alleged adoption by Feli @ Felu Mondalain was void, along with consequential claims to the suit properties.

They alleged that they learned of the adoption when Braj Nandan sought mutation in 1994 and challenged the mutation before revenue authorities and in a writ petition; the writ proceedings ended in 1998, when the High Court permitted withdrawal, according to the first appellate court, without directing that a fresh suit be filed or condoning delay.

The trial court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed that decision, finding the suit time-barred and the adoption not disproved.

The plaintiffs appealed under Section 100 CPC, contending that the courts had misapplied Article 57 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

1. Whether the suit challenging the adoption was barred by limitation under Article 57 of the Limitation Act, and whether the period spent in the mutation and writ proceedings could be excluded under Section 14.

2. Whether the concurrent findings on limitation and the validity of the adoption disclosed a substantial question of law warranting admission of the second appeal.

Article 57 of the Limitation Act prescribes a three-year limitation period for obtaining a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, running from the date the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff.

Section 14 permits exclusion of time spent prosecuting, with due diligence and in good faith, another civil proceeding against the same party where the court could not entertain it for lack of jurisdiction or a similar cause.

The Court also noted the first appellate court’s reliance on Ghasi Ram v. Chait Ram Saini, AIR 1998 SC 2476; M/s Shakti Tube Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2009 SC 1200; and N.V. Srinivasana Murthi v. Mariyamma, (2006) 1 JLJR (SC) 1.

A second appeal is not to be admitted absent a substantial question of law; concurrent findings are not disturbed merely because a party disputes the conclusions, absent perversity.

The courts below found that the plaintiffs knew of the adoption by 28 October 1994, when they appeared and objected in the mutation case, but did not bring a civil suit challenging the adoption within three years.

The first appellate court held that pursuing challenges to the mutation order did not establish a bona fide mistake or otherwise justify exclusion of that period under Section 14; it also found that the 1998 writ order permitted withdrawal and did not direct a fresh suit with delay condoned.

The appellate court had separately found that the plaintiffs failed to disprove the adoption.

The High Court concluded that the limitation issue had been properly considered by both courts and found no perversity or substantial question of law.

The High Court dismissed S.A. No. 480 of 2015, leaving undisturbed the concurrent dismissal of the suit. Any pending petitions were also disposed of.