Courts must avoid inconsistent treatment of delay-condonation applications arising from identical facts.

Twenty workmen instituted proceedings concerning their alleged termination on 2 January 2006 against twelve distinct legal entities through a consolidated application. The Labour Court issued notices/summonses, which were initially returned with an endorsement that the addresses were incorrect. Thereafter, the workmen supplied revised addresses, and notices were affixed at the premises after they were found locked. Treating such affixture as valid service, the Labour Court proceeded ex parte and passed judgments and awards against the petitioners

The petitioners asserted that they had not been duly served and became aware of the ex parte orders only during subsequent execution proceedings. They thereafter filed ten appeals, each accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. Delay was condoned in six matters, but the applications in four matters were rejected for want of sufficient explanation, despite arising from the same factual background

The petitioners challenged the rejection of the delay-condonation applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, contending, inter alia, that the original proceedings improperly joined employees and twelve separate entities and that they had a substantial case on merits

Whether the applications for condonation of delay in filing the appeals against the ex parte Labour Court orders ought to have been rejected when the petitioners disputed service and the applications arose from the same set of proceedings as six matters in which delay had been condoned?

Whether the divergent treatment of substantially identical delay-condonation applications warranted interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution?

Whether the disputed question regarding valid service of notices could be conclusively determined at the stage of considering delay condonation?

The Court exercised its supervisory and constitutional jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to examine the legality and propriety of the appellate authority’s refusal to condone delay

The Court applied the principle that disputed questions concerning valid service, particularly where notices were affixed at premises whose identity and address were contested, should not be conclusively determined without appropriate evidence

It also applied the principle that proceedings arising from substantially identical facts should receive consistent treatment and that a meritorious challenge should not ordinarily be defeated solely on a technical ground, subject to appropriate terms and costs

The petitioners also relied upon Sections 78 and 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, read with Rule 71, concerning the maintainability and procedure of the original proceedings; however, the High Court’s decision primarily turned on service, consistency, and condonation of delay

The Court found that the validity of service was factually disputed because the initial notices were returned for incorrect addresses, while the subsequent notices were merely affixed at locked premises after revised addresses were supplied. It was therefore premature to conclusively presume valid service without evidence establishing that the premises were the petitioners’ correct and undisputed addresses

The Court further noted that all ten appeals arose from the same underlying proceedings and factual circumstances. Since delay had been condoned in six matters, rejection of the remaining four applications on identical or substantially similar facts produced an anomalous and inconsistent result

To avoid such inconsistency and to permit adjudication on merits, the Court held that the delay applications should be entertained, while balancing the approximately six-year delay by imposing costs

It directed the Labour Court/appellate authority to entertain the petitioners’ applications for condonation of delay, subject to each petitioner depositing Rs. 5,000/- as costs in each petition within ten days from receipt of the order.

The connected appeals were thereby permitted to be heard along with the other matters arising from the same set of proceedings. Rule was made absolute to that extent