Courts must liberally condone delay in setting aside ex-parte decrees caused by counsel’s negligence.

The Plaintiff (Respondent No. 1) filed a civil suit seeking to declare a registered Power of Attorney (PoA) and subsequent sale deeds null and void, alleging that Defendant No. 2 (Jairam Dubey) forged the PoA to sell the Plaintiff's agricultural lands to the Appellants (Defendant No. 1).

Although the Appellants filed written statements asserting the validity of the transactions and their possession of the land, they failed to appear during the evidence stage and were proceeded against ex-parte.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiff, relying on forensic expert testimony which concluded the PoA signatures were forged.

The Appellants subsequently filed applications under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree, along with applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay.

They contended the delay was due to their previous counsel’s failure to communicate hearing dates and subsequent negligence in filing the appropriate legal remedies.

The Trial Court rejected these applications solely on the ground of delay without considering the merits.

1. Whether the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC and the accompanying Section 5 Limitation Act application on the grounds of delay.

2. Whether a litigant should be penalized for the negligence or inaction of their counsel in participating in trial proceedings or filing timely applications.

Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC regarding the setting aside of ex-parte decrees and Section 5 of the Limitation Act concerning the condonation of delay.

The principle established in Rafiq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr. (1981), which holds that a litigant should not suffer for the fault or negligence of their counsel once an advocate has been engaged.

The "liberal approach" doctrine as reaffirmed in Dwarika Prasad v. Prithvi Raj Singh (2024), emphasizing that procedural technicalities, such as the absence of a separate Section 5 application, should not obstruct the achievement of justice or a fair outcome on the merits.

The High Court observed that the Appellants had initially participated in the suit by filing written statements, suggesting their absence at the evidence stage was not deliberate but resulted from a lack of communication from their counsel.

The court reasoned that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC, courts must adopt a liberal approach to ensure parties are not deprived of the opportunity to contest a matter on its merits.

By applying the Rafiq precedent, the court determined that the Appellants were entitled to presume their advocate would represent them properly and should not be penalized for the advocate's failure to monitor proceedings.

Citing Dwarika Prasad, the court noted that the Trial Court took a "hyper-technical view" regarding the delay; the facts justifying the setting aside of the decree (Order 9 Rule 13) were intrinsically linked to the justification for the delay, thus satisfying the requirements for condonation.

The court concluded that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate.

The court condoned the delay in filing the MJCs and remanded the matters back to the Trial Court with a direction to decide the Order 9 Rule 13 CPC applications afresh on their merits.

The parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on April 21, 2026, with a mandate for the Trial Court to dispose of the applications within 30 days of appearance.