Courts should leniently condone delay and restore proceedings where plausible explanations are offered.

The parties’ disputes were referred to arbitration, and the learned Arbitrator delivered an award dated 27 July 2018.

The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on 9 October 2018.

That petition was dismissed for default on 6 March 2025 because the appellant’s advocate did not appear; the explanation was that the advocate had noted the old case number in the diary, whereas the matter appeared under a newly assigned number in the cause list.

The appellant thereafter filed an application under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking restoration of the Section 34 petition and condonation of a 25-day delay.

The Commercial Court refused to condone the delay, observing, inter alia, that the Section 5 application was undated.

The appellant preferred the present appeal with a further application for condonation of delay, explaining that the certified copy of the impugned order was issued only on 21 May 2026; the appeal was filed on 22 May 2026.

Whether the delay in making and filing the appeal against the Commercial Court’s order should be condoned on account of the delay in issuance of the certified copy.

Whether the 25-day delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 4 CPC should be condoned.

Whether the appellant had shown sufficient and plausible grounds for restoration of the Section 34 petition dismissed for default.

The Court applied Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which permits restoration of a suit or proceeding dismissed for default upon sufficient cause being shown.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, permits condonation of delay where sufficient cause is established.

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, governs the challenge to an arbitral award.

The Court reiterated that, while considering restoration and condonation applications, courts should adopt a lenient approach where a plausible explanation is offered; the quality of the explanation, rather than merely the length of the delay, is material.

However, such leniency cannot permit frivolous applications or render limitation provisions nugatory.

The Court found that the delay in the appeal was attributable to the late issuance of the certified copy: the copy was applied for on 20 February 2026, issued on 21 May 2026, and the appeal was filed the following day.

Since that delay could not fairly be attributed to the appellant, the Court condoned it in the interests of justice.

On the merits, the Court considered the advocate’s mistaken reference to the old case number a plausible explanation for non-appearance on 6 March 2025 and, consequently, for the dismissal of the Section 34 petition for default.

It further accepted the appellant’s explanation that time was required to obtain authorization for filing the restoration and condonation applications.

Applying the principle that a plausible explanation should ordinarily be accepted in restoration matters, particularly where the delay was only 25 days, the Court held that the Commercial Court had adopted an unduly strict approach.

It set aside the Commercial Court’s order dated 5 February 2026, allowed Misc. Judicial Case No. 03 of 2025, and restored the appellant’s Section 34 petition to its original file and number.

AO-COM/27/2026 was accordingly allowed, and CAN/2/2026 was disposed of.