Courts will not substitute expert technical assessments of transmission-line alignment absent illegality or mala fides.

The petitioner, claiming possession over land affected by a proposed 220 KV transmission line of the Assam Electricity Grid Corporation Limited (“AEGCL”), sought relocation of the proposed alignment from the original route to an alternative route through Dag Nos. 98 and 99, Village Pamgaon, Lanka Revenue Circle.

In an earlier writ petition, WP(C)/6459/2025, the High Court had directed the authorities to consider the petitioner’s representation and pass a speaking order; pursuant thereto, an order dated 23 December 2025 rejected the petitioner’s request but permitted him to suggest an alternative route, subject to accommodating affected persons.

The petitioner asserted that joint surveys were thereafter conducted, that he had shifted two affected families to his land, and that the alternative route had been accepted or at least taken cognizance of by the District Administration.

The Circle Officer stated that there was no objection to the alternative route if it was found technically feasible by AEGCL and if the two affected families were settled through legally valid gift deeds.

AEGCL, however, maintained that the proposed alternative route was technically unfeasible because of excessive angles of deviation, residential structures, a Government office boundary, and a public park.

It further contended that the map relied upon by the petitioner had not been approved or endorsed by AEGCL, whereas its own map reflected the relevant structures and route alignment.

The petitioner consequently invoked Article 226 seeking a writ of mandamus directing consideration and implementation of the alternative route.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus directing AEGCL and the State authorities to adopt the alternative route for the proposed 220 KV transmission line

Whether the High Court, in exercise of judicial review under Article 226, could substitute the petitioner’s proposed alignment for the technically determined route approved by AEGCL

Whether the petitioner remained entitled to compensation for loss caused by construction of the transmission line despite dismissal of the writ petition

The Court applied the principle that judicial review under Article 226 is limited where the impugned decision involves technical expertise, safety considerations, and public infrastructure planning.

Relying on Union of India v. Kushala Shetty, (2011) 12 SCC 69, the Court held that courts are not equipped to determine the viability or feasibility of a technically designed project or to substitute their assessment for that of specialised authorities; interference is warranted only in exceptional cases involving patent illegality, violation of law, or mala fides.

The Court also considered the petitioner’s potential entitlement to compensation under the applicable notification dated 4 November 2024 for loss occasioned by installation of the transmission lines.

Although joint surveys had apparently been undertaken after the order dated 23 December 2025, the petitioner’s map was neither prepared in consultation with nor approved by AEGCL.

The Circle Officer’s acknowledgement of the proposed route did not amount to technical approval, as it was based primarily on the petitioner’s communication and did not establish the route’s feasibility.

In contrast, AEGCL had provided specific technical reasons for rejecting the alternative alignment, including excessive deviation angles and the presence of houses, a Government office boundary, and a public park along the proposed route.

Since the alignment involved technical design and safety considerations, the Court held that it would be inappropriate to substitute the petitioner’s proposal for the opinion of the specialised agency.

Applying the limited judicial-review principle in Kushala Shetty, the Court found no demonstrated illegality, mala fides, or other ground warranting interference.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, and the interim order dated 27 April 2026 was vacated.

The Court clarified that dismissal would not prevent the petitioner from seeking appropriate compensation, if otherwise legally entitled under the applicable notification.