COVID-19 lockdown does not, by itself, extinguish the obligation to pay rent.

The parties entered into a registered lease deed dated 10 June 2019 containing an arbitration clause.

The respondents claimed rent arrears and other charges; the appellant argued in the arbitration that COVID-19 lockdown restrictions had prevented use and vacation of the premises.

The sole arbitrator awarded Rs. 10,40,587, with interest at 10% per annum.

The appellant’s application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was dismissed by the Commercial Court.

In appeal, the appellant argued that a partner holding a 5% share could not be jointly liable and that rent was not payable during lockdown.

Whether the award was liable to be set aside because a partner holding a 5% share in the LLP could not be held jointly and severally liable for the firm’s liabilities.

Whether rent or lease money was not payable for the period affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Whether the Commercial Court erred in rejecting the appellant’s application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, governs applications to set aside arbitral awards; the Court treated interference as confined to grounds available under that provision.

The Court stated that a partner’s liability in an LLP is governed by the partnership deed and that questions concerning the amount and manner of recovery may be considered by the executing court.

No precedent or separate statutory rule making rent automatically non-payable during the pandemic was identified in the judgment.

The Court found no basis to set aside the award merely because of the asserted 5% partnership share: the arbitrator had not fixed a separate liability for any individual partner, and questions about recovery were for the executing court.

On the lockdown argument, the appellant had shown no law establishing that rent or lease money was not payable during the pandemic.

The Court accordingly found no error in the Commercial Court’s conclusion that the award did not warrant interference under Section 34.

The pending applications were also disposed of.