Criminal abscondence alone does not justify dispensing with a disciplinary inquiry under Article 311(2)(b).

The respondent, a Delhi Police constable, was named in an FIR alleging offences including murder and offences under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. He was suspended and, on 19 February 2015, dismissed under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution without a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority relied on the FIR, reports stating that the respondent was evading arrest despite non-bailable warrants, and its view that witnesses would not testify against him

The respondent appealed, submitting that he had been dropped from the police charge-sheet. The SSP, Bulandshahar, subsequently forwarded a DSP’s report stating that the respondent had not been found involved in the alleged offences

The Appellate Authority nevertheless dismissed the appeal, questioning the medical evidence and villagers’ affidavits and affirming that an inquiry was impracticable. The Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the dismissal; Delhi Police challenged that decision by writ petition

1. Whether the Disciplinary Authority was justified in dispensing with a departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) on the grounds that the respondent was evading criminal proceedings and that witnesses would not come forward.

2. Whether the Tribunal’s decision to set aside the dismissal warranted interference, given the respondent’s exclusion from the charge-sheet and the material subsequently placed before the Appellate Authority.

Article 311(2)(b) permits dispensing with an inquiry only where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, on a reasonable assessment of the prevailing circumstances, that holding the inquiry is not reasonably practicable; the authority must record its reasons in writing.

Under Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel and Satyavir Singh v. Union of India, the exception is not to be invoked lightly, arbitrarily, or merely because the departmental case is weak. While abscondence may, in appropriate circumstances, make an inquiry or the provision of an opportunity impracticable, the decision remains subject to judicial review under Article 311(3).

The Court also applied the principles discussed in NDMC v. Sushil Kumar (Mali) and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Neeraj Kumar on the exceptional nature of dispensing with a disciplinary inquiry.

The Court found that the authorities had no credible independent material establishing the alleged misconduct and had relied principally on the respondent’s naming in the FIR, despite the police later dropping him from the charge-sheet and reporting that he had not been found involved.

The Appellate Authority’s rejection of the medical evidence and villagers’ affidavits was unsupported; its reliance on an assertion made by the DSP behind the respondent’s back further underscored the need for a formal inquiry.

Nor had the authorities attempted to serve a charge-sheet or otherwise established that the respondent would not participate in departmental proceedings. His failure to appear in the criminal case did not, by itself, establish that an inquiry was impracticable, and the prediction that witnesses would not testify was unsupported by evidence of threats or coercion.

The Court therefore agreed that Article 311(2)(b) had not been validly invoked.

The Court clarified that the respondent was not entitled to back wages.