Criminal proceedings against corporate officials summoned solely by designation are liable to be quashed.

The complainant had obtained finance for a 12-wheeler vehicle from petitioner no. 1, Hinduja Leyland Finance Limited, on 21 September 2013.

On 2 March 2015, after the vehicle was seized along with coal, the complainant alleged that Sanjay Singh, a staff member, and Vikash Kumar, the Branch Manager, assaulted the driver, took ₹50,000 from him, and seized the vehicle.

On the basis of the complaint, the complainant’s solemn-affirmation statement, and the statements of inquiry witnesses, the Judicial Magistrate found a prima facie case under Sections 323, 379, 504 and 506 of the IPC and issued the summoning order dated 5 August 2023 in Complaint Case No. 787 of 2016.

The Company, its Director, and its Branch Manager invoked Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, seeking quashing of the criminal proceeding, the cognizance order, and the summoning order.

1. Whether criminal summons could validly be issued against the petitioner no. 2, described only as the “Director” of the Company, and petitioner no. 3, described only as the “Branch Manager,” without specifying their individual names.

2. Whether the criminal proceeding and summoning order against the Director and Branch Manager were liable to be quashed where the alleged offences under the IPC were attributed to employees/persons involved in the incident and no specific statutory provision imposing vicarious criminal liability was identified.

The Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023.

It applied the principle that a criminal summons cannot be issued against a post or designation because a post is neither a natural person nor a juristic person; the individual occupying that post must be identified by name.

The Court also considered the principles stated in Suma Devi v. State of Jharkhand, concerning the impermissibility of summoning company employees merely by their designations, and ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 Supreme (Jhk) 988.

Further, relying on Sanjay Dutt v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 32, and Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609, as discussed in Ruchika Kakar v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 SCC OnLine Jhar 1769, the Court noted that an individual may be prosecuted for an offence committed on behalf of a company only where there is evidence of active participation coupled with criminal intent, or where the governing statute expressly provides for vicarious liability.

The Court found that petitioner nos. 2 and 3 had been summoned only by their designations—“Director” and “Branch Manager”—without mentioning the names of the persons holding those posts.

Applying the rule that a designation is not a person capable of being summoned or tried in criminal proceedings, the Court held that the Magistrate had committed a grave illegality.

The defect was fundamental because the criminal process had been directed against posts rather than identifiable individuals.

Consequently, continuation of the proceeding against petitioner nos. 2 and 3 would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

Although the petitioners also relied on the absence of vicarious liability under the IPC, the Court’s operative determination rested on the legally invalid issuance of summons against unnamed office-holders.

It accordingly quashed and set aside the entire criminal proceeding, the order taking cognizance, and the summoning order dated 5 August 2023 in Complaint Case No. 787 of 2016, qua petitioner nos. 2 and 3 only.

The petition was allowed to that limited extent, and any pending interlocutory application was disposed of as infructuous.