Criminal proceedings for rape on a false promise of marriage cannot be quashed merely upon compromise.

The prosecutrix alleged that she met the petitioner at a gym in March 2025 and that, after developing a relationship, the petitioner represented that he was unmarried and would marry her.

On that representation, he allegedly established physical relations with her at various locations. When she became pregnant and sought marriage, the petitioner allegedly refused, proposed abortion, and threatened to kill her and her parents.

She later learned that the petitioner was already married and had two children.

An FIR was registered at Police Station Gola Ka Mandir, Gwalior, as Crime No. 234/2026 for offences under Sections 69 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The petitioner invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings on the basis of a compromise.

The parties filed a compromise application and affidavits, and the Principal Registrar verified their identities, signatures, and voluntariness of the settlement.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR and consequential criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the prosecutrix.

Whether the alleged offences arising from physical relations obtained on a false promise of marriage, coupled with alleged threats, were of such a heinous and serious nature that they could not appropriately be quashed merely because the parties had settled the dispute.

Section 528 of the BNSS preserves the High Court’s inherent power to quash criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process.

Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Court held that the power to quash is distinct from statutory compounding under Section 320 CrPC and, although broad, must be exercised having regard to the nature and gravity of the offence; heinous offences such as rape ordinarily cannot be quashed merely on the basis of compromise, whereas offences possessing an overwhelmingly private or civil character may be quashed where the possibility of conviction is remote and continuation of proceedings would cause injustice.

The Court further relied on Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, and State of M.P. v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, applying the principle that prosecution for rape or attempted rape should not generally be terminated on the basis of settlement.

The principles reiterated from Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318, emphasize that rape is an offence against society and that compromise, including a proposed marriage, cannot ordinarily constitute a basis for leniency or quashing.

Although the compromise was verified as voluntary and supported by affidavits, the Court assessed the substance and gravity of the allegations rather than treating settlement as determinative.

The allegations indicated that the petitioner obtained physical relations by representing that he was unmarried and intended to marry the prosecutrix, while he was allegedly already married and had two children; he also allegedly threatened her and her parents when she sought recourse to law.

Applying Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, and Madanlal, the Court held that the case did not have a predominantly private or civil character.

In view of the seriousness of the allegations, the possibility of conviction could not be considered remote or bleak, and the possibility that the compromise resulted from pressure, inducement, or compulsion could not be excluded.

Consequently, continuation of the prosecution was not regarded as an abuse of process warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

It held that the alleged rape on the false promise of marriage and accompanying threats constituted serious and heinous conduct for which a compromise could not justify quashing.

The petition was dismissed, and all pending interlocutory applications, if any, were disposed of.