Criminal prosecution for medical negligence requires prior independent expert opinion and proof of gross negligence.

The complainant alleged that his pregnant daughter was under the treatment of petitioner no. 1, a gynaecologist, from 14 January 2016 to 24 August 2016.

When labour pains arose, she was admitted to petitioner no. 1’s clinic. It was alleged that, despite payment of ₹30,000 for a proposed caesarean operation, the doctor did not attend her, and the delivery was conducted by the nurse and compounder.

The doctor allegedly arrived later, referred the patient to IGIMS/PMCH, Patna, and the patient died at the clinic from excessive bleeding.

On the basis of the complainant’s application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., Town P.S. Case No. 262 of 2016 was registered for offences under Sections 304A, 406 and 34 IPC.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Samastipur, took cognizance on 8 May 2017.

The accused petitioners sought quashing of the FIR, the criminal proceedings and the cognizance order under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Whether the FIR and criminal proceedings for alleged medical negligence under Sections 304A, 406 and 34 IPC were liable to be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the absence of a prior independent medical expert opinion.

Whether the allegations and investigation materials disclosed the degree of gross negligence, recklessness or criminal incompetence necessary to sustain prosecution under Section 304A IPC against the doctor and the other petitioners.

Whether the order dated 8 May 2017 taking cognizance was legally sustainable.

The Court considered Section 304A IPC, which criminalises causing death by a rash or negligent act, along with Sections 406 and 34 IPC and the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The Court applied Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1, particularly paragraph 52, which requires credible and independent medical opinion before prosecuting a doctor for criminal rashness or negligence and distinguishes criminal negligence from an ordinary error of judgment or adverse medical outcome.

The Court also relied on Martin F. D’Souza v. Mohd. Ishfaq, (2009) 3 SCC 1, and the principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, under which proceedings may be quashed where the allegations, taken at face value, do not disclose the ingredients of an offence or where continuation of the prosecution would constitute an abuse of process.

Criminal liability for medical negligence requires a high degree of negligence—amounting to gross incompetence or reckless indifference—and not merely a bad result or simple lack of care.

The Court found that no mandatory prior independent medical expert opinion had been obtained before initiating the criminal proceedings or filing the charge-sheet against the petitioners, contrary to the safeguards laid down in Jacob Mathew.

It further held that the allegations and materials collected during investigation did not establish that petitioner no. 1’s conduct amounted to gross negligence, reckless indifference or incompetence of the degree required for criminal liability under Section 304A IPC.

The Court emphasised that a doctor is not criminally negligent merely because the treatment resulted in death or because another medical practitioner might have adopted a different approach.

Since the allegations against petitioners nos. 2 and 3 were derivative of the allegations against petitioner no. 1, and no independent basis for their criminal liability was shown, continuation of the prosecution against them was also found unjustified.

It held that the absence of the required expert medical opinion, together with the failure of the allegations and investigation materials to disclose gross criminal negligence, rendered the prosecution unsustainable.

Accordingly, the FIR in Town P.S. Case No. 262 of 2016, the entire criminal proceeding arising from it, and the cognizance order dated 8 May 2017 were quashed.

The application was allowed.