Criminal Prosecution of a Doctor for Negligence Requires Prior Independent Medical Opinion Confirming Gross Recklessness

The Petitioner, a surgeon, performed a Cesarean section on Opposite Party No. 2 (O.P. No. 2) in July 2014

O.P. No. 2 subsequently developed abdominal complications and underwent further treatments at S.K.M.C.H. and other facilities

She later filed an F.I.R. alleging that the Petitioner negligently left a surgical towel in her abdomen, which was purportedly removed by another doctor in February 2015

Diagnostic reports (ultrasounds) between July 2014 and February 2015 did not show any foreign body

The police filed a chargesheet under Sections 337, 338, and 506 of the IPC

The Trial Court took cognizance on 29.02.2016

Notably, the Investigating Officer sought a medical opinion, but the chargesheet was filed before the Medical Board’s report—which eventually found no proof of a recovered towel—was received

The court primarily applied the standard of "gross negligence" required for criminal liability of doctors as established in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, which mandates that a medical practitioner is only liable if their conduct falls below the standard of a reasonably competent practitioner and requires a "credible opinion" from a competent doctor before entertaining a complaint

It followed Kusum Sharma v. Batra Hospital, emphasizing that an error of judgment or unsuccessful treatment does not ipso facto amount to negligence

Additionally, it relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal regarding the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of law

The court reasoned that medical professionals are protected from frivolous prosecution unless the negligence is "gross" and "culpable"

In this case, the court noted a significant lack of medical evidence: multiple ultrasound reports and surgical notes from subsequent government hospitals (S.K.M.C.H.) failed to mention any foreign body

Crucially, the court found that the Trial Court took cognizance in a mechanical manner without waiting for the Medical Board's report, which ultimately exonerated the Petitioner by stating there was no proof of a recovered surgical towel

Furthermore, the court observed that the ingredients for "criminal intimidation" under Section 506 IPC were entirely absent from the F.I.R.

Since the expert opinion required by the Jacob Mathew guidelines did not support the prosecution, the court determined that continuing the trial would be an abuse of process

The court allowed the application and quashed the order of cognizance dated 29.02.2016 and the entire criminal proceeding arising from Brahampura P.S. Case No. 314 of 2015