### Criminal Prosecution Quashed Where Dispute is Predominantly Civil and SC/ST Act Allegations Lack Public View

The appellants challenged an order dated 28.04.2022 passed by the Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Darbhanga, which rejected their discharge application under Section 227 Cr.P.C.

The informant alleged that in 2016, he entered into an agreement to purchase land from the accused parties and paid ₹20,00,000/- as an advance.

He further alleged that on 09.03.2017, the accused visited his house, threatened him at gunpoint, refused to refund the money, and abused him using "caste names".

The police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506, and 120(B) IPC, and Sections 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The appellants argued the dispute was purely civil and the SC/ST charges were fabricated to exert pressure.

Whether the allegations in the FIR and the materials collected during the investigation prima facie constitute offences under the SC/ST (POA) Act when the incident allegedly occurred inside a private house.

Whether a criminal prosecution can be maintained for a dispute that is essentially civil in nature arising out of a land agreement.

The court relied on Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, noting that an offence is only made out if the insult occurs in "public view".

It applied the precedent in Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, which requires the intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste specifically because of their caste.

Furthermore, the court followed the principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, specifically category (1), (5), and (7), regarding the quashing of proceedings that are maliciously instituted or fail to disclose a cognizable offence.

It also applied Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, holding that the court may quash proceedings where a civil dispute is given the cloak of a criminal offence.

The Court observed that the core of the matter was a land dispute arising from an oral agreement and subsequent monetary transaction.

Regarding the SC/ST Act charges, the Court noted that the alleged abuses took place at 10:00 PM inside the informant's house; therefore, the statutory requirement of the offence being committed in "any place within public view" was not satisfied.

Following the Keshaw Mahto ruling, the Court found that mere knowledge of the complainant’s caste or mentioning a caste name without the specific intent to humiliate in public does not attract Section 3(1)(r) or (s).

The Court further determined that the appellants were not the primary beneficiaries of the land deal and the criminal proceedings were manifestly attended with mala fides to settle a civil grievance.

The Court held that when a dispute is primarily civil and the criminal allegations do not meet the specific statutory ingredients of the SC/ST Act, the proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of law.

The Trial Court was directed to return the records.