Daughters’ Challenge to Court-Executed Land Sale Fails After Decree on Father’s 1984 Deal Became Final: P&H HC

The appellants, daughters of Umrao Singh, sued for declarations challenging a 2012 court-executed sale deed, a 2003 Will and consequential revenue mutations.

They claimed the agricultural land was ancestral coparcenary property and that their father could not alienate it without their consent or legal necessity

The sale deed implemented a decree for specific performance arising from an agreement to sell executed in 1984; the decree was upheld in appeal and the SLP was dismissed.

The appellants had been impleaded as Umrao Singh’s legal representatives in the second appeal and had also contested execution proceedings

The trial Court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate Court affirmed, finding, among other things, that the appellants had not established their coparcenary rights or possession and had omitted to seek possession

They appealed under Section 100 CPC, principally relying on Article 109 of the Limitation Act

Article 109 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes twelve years for a suit by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law to set aside the father’s alienation of ancestral property, running from when the alienee takes possession

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, as amended, recognises a daughter’s coparcenary rights, subject to the statutory protection for dispositions or alienations before 20 December 2004; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1, confirms that a daughter’s coparcenary right does not depend on her father being alive on 9 September 2005

Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an agreement to sell does not itself create an interest in immovable property

The Court relied on Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy v. V. Manjunath, (2021) 19 SCC 263, and N.S. Balaji v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, 2024 (1) CCC 56 (SC), for the principles that a Karta may bind joint-family property by an alienation, subject to recognised limits such as legal necessity or benefit of the estate

Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars a mere declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief, omits to do so

Under Section 100 CPC, a second appeal lies only where a substantial question of law arises; concurrent factual findings are not disturbed absent perversity or material legal error

The Court accepted that Article 109 specifies a twelve-year period running from the alienee’s possession, not merely from execution of the sale deed, but held that this did not resolve the appeal: the appellants still had to establish an enforceable right and overcome the finality of the specific-performance decree

The agreement and decree predated the 20 December 2004 cut-off, and the 2012 deed was executed in implementation of that decree rather than as a fresh, voluntary alienation

The appellants had participated in the earlier appellate and execution proceedings, and could not use a separate suit to reopen the adjudicated transaction

The cited coparcenary authorities did not displace the decree’s finality

Further, the Courts’ finding that possession had been delivered during the suit was supported by the evidence; the appellants sought no consequential possession relief, and the challenge to the Will was unsupported by proof of forgery or invalid execution

No perversity or material error of law was shown

Even assuming Article 109 applied, it did not entitle the appellants to invalidate a sale deed executed pursuant to a decree that had attained finality, particularly given their failure to establish an enforceable right and seek consequential possession relief.

The regular second appeal was dismissed, and the judgments and decrees of the Courts below were affirmed