Death sentence for killing police inspector commuted to life imprisonment for 25 years without remission

On 29 November 2014, a police party went to arrest the appellant, who was wanted in another criminal case.

According to the prosecution, when the police party attempted to apprehend him, the appellant threatened the officers and fired a country-made pistol at Inspector Raj Kumar Singh, causing a fatal firearm injury to his chest.

The appellant was allegedly overpowered at the spot, and the pistol and cartridges were recovered.

The FIR was registered at 6:45 p.m., after the first informant had taken the injured Inspector to hospital and returned to the scene.

The Sessions Court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 506 IPC and Sections 25 and 27(1) of the Arms Act.

It imposed the death penalty for the offence under Section 302 IPC, along with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

The death sentence was referred to the High Court for confirmation under Section 366(1) CrPC, and the appellant filed the present appeal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally shot and caused the death of Inspector Raj Kumar Singh, thereby committing an offence under Section 302 IPC?

Whether the alleged delay in lodging the FIR, absence of independent public witnesses, inconsistencies in the evidence, medical evidence, forensic reports, and investigative lapses created a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case?

Whether the convictions under Section 506 IPC and Sections 25 and 27(1) of the Arms Act were sustainable?

Whether the death penalty imposed under Section 302 IPC was justified under the “rarest of rare” doctrine, after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the possibility of reform?

Whether the appellant’s alleged previous conviction could be relied upon for sentencing without compliance with Section 298 CrPC?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 506 IPC concerning murder and criminal intimidation, and Sections 25 and 27(1) of the Arms Act concerning unlawful possession and use of a firearm.

It relied on the settled principle that credible testimony of police witnesses is not to be rejected merely because they are police officers, and that absence of independent witnesses is not by itself fatal where official evidence is otherwise reliable, as recognised in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, Govindaraju v. State, and Praveen Kumar v. State of Karnataka.

Delay in lodging an FIR is not necessarily fatal if satisfactorily explained, under Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu, Ram Jag v. State of U.P., and State of H.P. v. Gian Chand.

Investigative lapses do not automatically warrant acquittal if the substantive evidence otherwise establishes guilt, as held in Dhanaj Singh v. State of Punjab.

For sentencing, the Court applied Sections 235(2), 354(3) and 366 CrPC, and the principles in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab: life imprisonment is the rule, death is an exception, and death may be imposed only where the case is among the “rarest of rare” cases and life imprisonment is unquestionably inadequate.

The Court also applied the principles in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, requiring consideration of the offender’s background, jail conduct, mitigating circumstances, and probability of reform.

Section 298 CrPC requires prescribed proof of a previous conviction before it can be relied upon for sentencing.

The High Court found PW-1 and PW-2 to be consistent and trustworthy eyewitnesses whose presence at the scene was corroborated by the police movement entry, recovery documents, the appellant’s own admission of the police party’s presence under Section 313 CrPC, the medical evidence, and the forensic material.

The two-and-a-half-hour interval before registration of the FIR was satisfactorily explained by the informant’s conduct in taking the injured Inspector to hospital, returning to the scene, completing the arrest and recovery formalities, and then lodging the FIR.

The Court held that the deceased’s movement after the gunshot was medically and factually possible, and that the blood trail and bloodstains supported the eyewitness account.

The absence of public witnesses, the presence of a medical “Vigo,” discrepancies regarding time, and non-production of some personal effects were treated as minor or explainable circumstances that did not discredit the core prosecution case.

The recovery and forensic evidence supported the use and working condition of the country-made pistol, and did not exclude its involvement in the shooting.

Accordingly, the convictions were upheld.

On sentencing, however, the Court distinguished between the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the offender.

It held that the murder involved a single firearm shot and a single fatal injury, was not shown to be diabolical or exceptionally cruel, and appeared to have occurred in the course of the appellant’s attempt to evade arrest.

The Court also considered the appellant’s socio-economic background, age of 51 years, long incarceration, and satisfactory jail conduct, noting that the State had not established that he was beyond reform.

The alleged prior conviction and criminal history were not given sentencing weight because the mandatory procedure under Section 298 CrPC had not been followed and no certified judgment of conviction had been produced.

Applying the “rarest of rare” standard and the requirement to consider the possibility of reformation, the Court concluded that the death penalty was not warranted.

The appellant’s convictions under Sections 302 and 506 IPC and Sections 25 and 27(1) of the Arms Act were upheld.

However, the death sentence under Section 302 IPC was commuted to imprisonment for life for a minimum period of 25 years without remission.

The remaining sentences imposed for the other offences were maintained and were to operate as directed by the Sessions Court.

The death reference under Section 366 CrPC was consequently not confirmed.