Deemed suspension for criminal detention cannot substitute presidential sanction for instituting post-retirement disciplinary proceedings.

The applicant, a retired Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise, was arrested on May 25, 2020, following an FIR alleging illegal gratification.

Consequently, he was placed under "deemed suspension" on May 28, 2020, under Rule 10(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules due to his detention exceeding 48 hours.

The applicant subsequently retired on November 30, 2020.

More than two years post-retirement, on December 29, 2022, the respondents issued a memorandum initiating departmental proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules.

The applicant challenged this on the grounds that the proceedings were instituted without the mandatory prior sanction of the President required for retired employees.

1. Whether the departmental proceedings initiated against the retired applicant satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.

2. Whether the date of "deemed suspension" (due to criminal arrest) can be treated as the date of "institution" of departmental proceedings under Rule 9(6)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, in the absence of a nexus with the disciplinary inquiry.

Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, which mandates that departmental proceedings against a retired government servant shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President.

Rule 9(6)(a), which provides a deeming fiction that proceedings are instituted on the date of suspension, provided there is a clear nexus between the suspension and the contemplated disciplinary proceedings.

The Tribunal observed that the respondents failed to obtain the President's sanction before issuing the charge memorandum in 2022.

The Tribunal reasoned that the 2020 suspension was a "deemed suspension" triggered automatically by criminal detention under Rule 10(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, rather than a suspension in contemplation of a specific disciplinary inquiry.

Since no disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or initiated prior to the applicant’s retirement on November 30, 2020, there was no "nexus" between the arrest-related suspension and the later departmental inquiry.

Therefore, the deeming provision of Rule 9(6)(a) could not be invoked to bypass the requirement for Presidential sanction.

The date of detention-based suspension does not qualify as the date of institution for departmental inquiries if no such inquiry was contemplated at that time.

Consequently, the OA was allowed, and the impugned memorandum and disciplinary proceedings were quashed and set aside.