Defective investigation alone cannot justify acquittal where credible evidence establishes guilt.

On 13 July 2005, Ganesh Mondal was allegedly attacked near his residence after a dispute concerning a loan/dadan payment. The prosecution alleged that Sunil Mondal, Dwijen Mondal and another accused hurled bombs at Ganesh, while the remaining accused prevented intervention. Ganesh was taken first to Beniagram Hospital and thereafter to S.D. Hospital, Jangipur, where he died on 14 July 2005. The FIR was lodged by Swapan Mondal (PW-1) on 15 July 2005, alleging offences under Sections 302/34 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Explosive Substances Act.

The prosecution examined fifteen witnesses, including eyewitnesses and the post-mortem doctor. The trial court convicted Sunil Mondal and Dwijen Mondal under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fine, while acquitting Krishna Mondal and Dinesh Mondal and acquitting all accused of the Explosive Substances Act charges. The present appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of Sunil and Dwijen.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants caused Ganesh Mondal’s death by hurling bombs at him, notwithstanding the discrepancies in the eyewitness testimony and the medical evidence describing the death as “probably homicidal”?

Whether the delay in lodging the FIR, the non-seizure of bomb remnants and the deceased’s clothes, and the non-examination of the original Investigating Officer rendered the prosecution case unreliable or entitled the appellants to acquittal?

Whether the acts of the appellants established a shared common intention sufficient to sustain their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 34 IPC: Section 302 punishes murder, while Section 34 attaches joint liability where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention.

Section 134 of the Evidence Act provides that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove a fact; the quality and reliability of evidence are determinative, as explained in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras.

Medical evidence is ordinarily corroborative and does not displace credible eyewitness testimony unless it completely rules out the alleged manner of injury, as held in Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat.

Relationship with the deceased does not, by itself, discredit a witness, consistent with Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab.

Minor discrepancies caused by lapse of time or ordinary errors of observation do not destroy otherwise credible testimony, under State of Rajasthan v. Kalki and State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony.

Delay in lodging an FIR may be excused where satisfactorily explained by the need to secure urgent medical treatment, as recognised in Ravi Kumar v. State of Punjab.

Finally, defective investigation or non-examination of the Investigating Officer is not, by itself, a ground for acquittal where reliable substantive evidence exists, under Karnel Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Ram Bali v. State of U.P., Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., and Lahu Kamlakar Patil v. State of Maharashtra.

The Court held that the post-mortem findings—extensive lacerations, internal injuries, torn intestinal mesentery and peritoneal haemorrhage—were consistent with injuries caused by an explosion and established that Ganesh’s death was homicidal.

The evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-5 and PW-8 consistently identified Sunil and Dwijen as participants who hurled bombs, even though the witnesses differed regarding the identity of a third assailant and the precise location of the attack. Those discrepancies were treated as minor because they did not affect the consistent attribution of the assault to the appellants.

The delay in lodging the FIR was reasonably explained by the deceased’s transfer between hospitals and the subsequent communication of his death.

The Court also held that the investigative lapses, including non-seizure of bomb remnants and non-examination of the first Investigating Officer, did not outweigh the credible ocular evidence.

The appellants acted together, used the same lethal means, targeted the same victim and successively attacked him in one continuous occurrence, thereby establishing common intention under Section 34 IPC.

The acquittal under Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act remained undisturbed. The appellants were granted set-off for the period already undergone under Section 428 CrPC, and those in custody were directed to continue serving their sentences.