Delay and laches bar a belated writ challenge to departmental termination.

The Petitioner was appointed as a teacher in a Municipal Corporation school on probation for three years by appointment order dated 23 June 2009.

Within approximately six months, an FIR was registered against him under Sections 506(II), 323 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code in relation to allegations involving a student.

He was suspended on 1 July 2011, and the Municipal Corporation initiated departmental proceedings and served him with a charge-sheet.

The departmental inquiry concluded that the Petitioner had committed grave misconduct, and his services were terminated by order dated 14 July 2014.

The Petitioner had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 10804 of 2013 challenging the show-cause notice and seeking revocation of his suspension.

He withdrew that petition on 4 January 2022 after the termination order had already been passed.

The present petition challenging the termination order was filed on 26 August 2022, approximately eight years after the impugned order.

During the proceedings, the Respondent produced the criminal court’s judgment dated 7 October 2014, by which the Petitioner was convicted under Sections 354, 323, 363 and 506(II) of the IPC; the Petitioner stated that a criminal revision was pending.

Whether the writ petition challenging the termination order was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, particularly when the Petitioner knew of the order but waited until 2022 to challenge it?

Whether the departmental inquiry and consequential termination were vitiated by breach of natural justice or procedural illegality?

Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could reappreciate the evidence or interfere with the findings and punishment imposed in the departmental inquiry?

The Court applied the principle that a writ petition may be rejected on the ground of unexplained delay and laches, and that ignorance of law does not excuse failure to take appropriate legal steps within the prescribed or reasonable period, relying on Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Government of U.P., (1975) 4 SCC 378.

In judicial review of departmental proceedings under Article 226, the High Court does not sit as an appellate court over the inquiry findings; interference is permissible where the inquiry violates natural justice or statutory procedure, is based on no evidence, relies on irrelevant considerations, or reaches a conclusion that is perverse or one that no reasonable person could reach. The Court relied on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6, for this limited scope of review.

The Court held that the Petitioner was aware of the termination order dated 14 July 2014 but filed the present petition only on 26 August 2022.

His explanation that he was a layman and believed that his earlier writ petition prevented the Corporation from proceeding further was treated as ignorance of law and was not accepted as a justification for the delay.

The Court further found that the Petitioner had been given a show-cause notice and a full opportunity to participate in the departmental inquiry, and that no breach of natural justice was established.

Although the Court noted the seriousness of the allegations and the criminal conviction, it expressly stated that its decision was not based merely on the criminal court’s findings.

Applying the limited standard of judicial review, the Court found no perversity or other ground warranting interference with the departmental findings or the termination order.

It held that the petition suffered from gross delay and laches, that the departmental inquiry was conducted with adequate procedural fairness, and that the findings were not shown to be perverse or legally unsustainable.

Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 11241 of 2022 was dismissed, and the termination order dated 14 July 2014 was not disturbed.