Delay beyond Section 34(3)’s outer limit cannot be condoned for administrative processing or settlement efforts.

The Petitioner challenged the arbitral award dated 19 May 2025 and the additional award dated 7 August 2025 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”).

The Petitioner proceeded on the basis that limitation commenced from the date of the additional award. Accordingly, the three-month limitation period expired on 7 November 2025, and the additional thirty-day period under the proviso to Section 34(3) expired on 7 December 2025.

The Petitioner attributed the delay to internal administrative processing through various departmental levels, followed by attempts to settle the dispute under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme III.

The Petitioner admitted a delay of 178 days beyond the statutory period and sought condonation under Section 34(3) of the Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Respondent opposed the application, contending that the delay exceeded the non-extendable statutory limit and that no sufficient cause had been shown.

Whether the Petitioner’s internal administrative processing of the matter constituted “sufficient cause” under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act for condoning the delay in filing the Section 34 petition?

Whether the Petitioner’s settlement efforts under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme III could suspend or extend the limitation period prescribed under Section 34(3)?

Whether the Court had jurisdiction to condone a delay of 178 days beyond the maximum period of three months plus thirty days prescribed under Section 34(3)?

The Court applied Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, under which a petition for setting aside an arbitral award must be filed within three months from receipt of the award or disposal of a Section 33 request; the Court may entertain it for a further period of thirty days upon sufficient cause being shown, “but not thereafter”.

The Court held that this outer limit is mandatory and excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 beyond the further period of thirty days.

It relied on Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470; State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210; and P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445, which establish that the expression “but not thereafter” bars condonation beyond the maximum statutory period.

The Court also relied on National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1060, and Chief Engineer, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Enarch Consultants Pvt. Ltd., 2026:DHC:5562, for the mandatory nature of the limitation period under Section 34(3).

The Court accepted the Petitioner’s own computation that limitation commenced from the additional award dated 7 August 2025. Therefore, the statutory three-month period expired on 7 November 2025 and the maximum permissible extension expired on 7 December 2025.

The movement of the file through the Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer, Chief Engineer, Law Department, and Standing Counsel was treated as an internal administrative process that could neither suspend nor extend the statutory limitation period.

The settlement efforts were initiated only in February 2026, after expiry of both the initial limitation period and the additional thirty-day period, and therefore could not explain the failure to file the petition within time.

In any event, the Court held that settlement discussions do not prevent a party from filing a protective Section 34 petition while pursuing settlement simultaneously.

Consequently, neither ground constituted sufficient cause, and the Court lacked jurisdiction to condone the admitted 178-day delay beyond the statutory outer limit.

Since the petition was filed beyond the maximum period permissible under Section 34(3), the Court dismissed the Section 34 petition as barred by limitation.

All pending applications were also dismissed, with no order as to costs.