DELAY CONDONATION REFUSED ABSENT SUFFICIENT CAUSE, DESPITE MEDICAL OR PANDEMIC CLAIMS.

The appellant filed a first appeal seeking condonation of a delay of 3 years and 60 days in challenging a decree, judgment, and order dated January 8, 2018, passed by the City Civil Court, Mumbai, in Summary Suit No. 1467 of 2017.

The impugned order directed the original defendants (appellants) to pay Rs. 15,25,000/- to the plaintiff (respondent) along with interest at 18% on a principal amount of Rs. 10 lakhs.

The appeal was required to be filed within 30 days under Section 15 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, by February 8, 2018, or May 16, 2018, considering the date of obtaining a certified copy.

The appeal was actually filed on April 8, 2021, resulting in a delay of close to 3 years.

The appellant's application cited medical conditions of a director for the period 2015-2016.

The appellant's application cited income tax proceedings in 2017 and 2019.

The appellant's application cited an advocate informing them of the impugned order.

The appellant's application cited medical reasons of directors post-March 2019.

The appellant's application cited the COVID-19 pandemic.

The appellant decided to challenge the order upon receiving summons for execution of the decree on January 21, 2021.

Whether the appellant demonstrated "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay of 3 years and 60 days in filing the first appeal?

The court applied the principle of "sufficient cause" required for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act, 1963.

The court referenced Section 15 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, which stipulates a 30-day period for filing appeals.

The court drew support from the Supreme Court's decision in *Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. v. Karnataka Housing Board Ors.* (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969) which exhaustively dealt with the phrase "sufficient cause".

The court also applied the clarification by the Supreme Court that the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be a reason for condoning delay where the limitation period had already expired prior to March 2020.

The court found that the reasons provided by the appellant did not constitute "sufficient cause" for the significant delay.

The medical conditions of the director, Mrs. Priya Somani, referred to the period 2015-2016, which was much prior to the impugned order of January 2018 and therefore irrelevant.

The appellant's successful pursuit of income tax proceedings in 2017 and 2019 indicated their ability to pursue legal remedies, contradicting their claim of being unable to file the present appeal within the limitation period.

The court noted that the appellant's advocate had informed them about the impugned order, indicating awareness, yet no challenge was filed timely.

Crucially, there was no explanation for the period from January 2018 to March 2019, during which the limitation period expired.

The medical reasons for directors from paragraph 30 onwards pertained to the period post-March 2019, by which time the limitation had already expired.

The court rejected the COVID-19 pandemic as a ground for delay, citing the Supreme Court's clarification that it cannot be considered if the limitation period expired before March 2020.

The court viewed the decision to challenge the decree only after receiving execution summons in 2021 as a tactic to frustrate the successful decree holder, which should not be encouraged without sufficient cause.

The claim of the company having no business was noted for the date of the application's filing, not for the period 2018-2021, and the ability to pursue income tax proceedings further questioned the business cessation claim for the relevant period.

Consequently, the Interim Application for condonation of delay was dismissed.

As a result, the First Appeal also stood dismissed, and the Interim Application for stay of the impugned order did not survive.