Delay in filing a restoration application must be adjudicated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The petitioner, a landowner dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority under Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, had filed an application under Section 10 of the Act.

The application remained pending for approximately two years and was dismissed for want of prosecution on 6 September 2025 due to the absence of the petitioner’s advocate.

The petitioner thereafter filed a restoration application seeking recall of the dismissal order, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, explaining a delay of 37 days.

The 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Deesa, rejected the delay-condonation application on 17 March 2026, after questioning whether delay could be condoned under the 1962 Act and refusing an adjournment sought by counsel who stated that the petitioner intended to engage a new advocate.

The petitioner challenged that order before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the application for condonation of a 37-day delay in filing the restoration application was required to be considered under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the applicable procedure for restoration under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Whether the petitioner’s restoration application seeking recall of the order dated 6 September 2025 dismissing the Section 10 application for want of prosecution ought to be allowed.

Whether the court below was justified in rejecting the delay-condonation application on the ground that the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 did not itself provide for condonation of delay.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which permits condonation of delay where sufficient cause is shown, to the delayed filing of the restoration application.

It held that a restoration application and the accompanying delay-condonation application were required to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The Court also relied on Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, under which a person dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority may apply for determination of the appropriate compensation; that provision does not prescribe a period of limitation for filing such an application.

The court below was therefore not required to determine whether the 1962 Act independently contained a provision for condonation of delay in the context of the restoration application.

The High Court found that the court below had considered an irrelevant question—whether the 1962 Act contained a provision for condonation of delay—instead of examining the petitioner’s application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The delay related not to the original application under Section 10 of the 1962 Act, but to the subsequent restoration application filed to recall the dismissal for want of prosecution.

Accordingly, the relevant inquiry was whether sufficient cause existed for condoning the 37-day delay, applying the restoration procedure under the CPC.

The High Court further held that the refusal of an adjournment sought in connection with the proposed change of advocate, followed by dismissal of the delay application on the assumption that the petitioner intended to prolong the litigation, did not constitute a legally sustainable basis for rejection.

Since the relevant statutory provisions had not been considered, the impugned order was unsustainable.

It allowed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and condoned the 37-day delay.

It also allowed the restoration application, recalled the order dated 6 September 2025, and restored the petitioner’s application under Section 10 of the 1962 Act, registered as CMA DC No. 115 of 2023, to its original number.

The concerned court was directed to decide that application on merits and in accordance with law.