Delay in restoring a dismissed proceeding must be considered under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The petitioner, a landowner dissatisfied with the compensation determined under Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, had filed an application under Section 10 of the Act, registered as CMA DC No. 116 of 2023.

The application remained pending for approximately two years and was dismissed on 6 September 2025 for want of prosecution due to the absence of the petitioner’s advocate.

The petitioner subsequently filed a restoration application seeking recall of the dismissal order, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, involving a delay of 37 days.

The 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Deesa, rejected the delay-condonation application on 17 March 2026.

Whether the application for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application was required to be considered under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the applicable procedure governing restoration applications, rather than by examining whether the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 independently provided for condonation of delay.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to condonation of the 37-day delay and restoration of the application under Section 10 of the 1962 Act dismissed for want of prosecution.

The court applied Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, which permits an aggrieved landowner dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority to seek adjudication and does not prescribe a limitation period for such an application.

It further applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned when sufficient cause is shown, and held that an application seeking condonation of delay in filing a restoration application must be considered in accordance with that provision and the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The court also recognized that a restoration application seeking recall of an order dismissing proceedings for default is procedurally distinct from the original application under Section 10 of the 1962 Act.

The High Court held that the subordinate court had addressed the wrong question.

The delay-condonation application accompanied the restoration application and did not relate to the filing of the original Section 10 application; therefore, there was no occasion to inquire whether the 1962 Act itself contained a provision for condonation of delay.

The relevant inquiry was whether the 37-day delay in filing the restoration application should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the procedure governing restoration.

The subordinate court instead rejected the application after refusing the advocate’s request for time to respond to the court’s query and to engage a new advocate, and it incorrectly inferred that the request was intended to delay the proceedings.

Since the relevant statutory provisions and procedural principles had not been considered, the rejection order could not stand.

It allowed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and condoned the 37-day delay.

It also allowed the restoration application, recalled the order dated 6 September 2025, and restored CMA DC No. 116 of 2023, filed under Section 10 of the 1962 Act, to its original number.

The concerned court was directed to decide that application on its merits and strictly in accordance with law.