Delay in filing an appeal may be condoned for sufficient counsel-related cause, subject to compensatory costs.

The applicant and respondent were legally married on 16 March 2006 and had two children from the marriage. Differences subsequently arose, leading the respondent to institute Divorce Suit No. 45 of 2013 before the Judge, District Council Court, Shillong.

The applicant initially contested the proceedings and cross-examined two of the respondent’s witnesses. However, owing to the absence of her counsel on 12 August 2014, the proceedings were directed to continue ex parte. Her application to recall that order was rejected when counsel again remained absent, and an ex parte judgment and decree followed on 26 September 2014.

An application to set aside the ex parte judgment and related orders was rejected on 31 July 2015, but, on appeal, the High Court set aside the relevant orders and remanded the matter for fresh hearing.

On 25 July 2025, the District Council Court again dissolved the marriage under Section 10(1)(x) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869.

The applicant thereafter filed an appeal before the High Court, but with a delay of 210 days. She attributed the delay to engaging new counsel in February 2026, obtaining the case records from her previous counsel, and the time required for the new counsel to examine the record and prepare the appeal.

Whether the applicant had shown “sufficient cause” for condonation of the 210-day delay in filing the appeal under the applicable limitation principles?

Whether, despite the respondent’s objection that the delay was wilful and gross, the delay ought to be condoned in the interests of substantial justice, subject to appropriate terms?

The Court applied the “sufficient cause” standard under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which permits condonation of delay where the applicant establishes a satisfactory explanation.

It relied principally on N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, holding that limitation rules are intended to prevent dilatory tactics rather than destroy substantive rights; delay should ordinarily receive a liberal construction where the explanation is bona fide and not part of a deliberate strategy, while the opposite party’s prejudice may be addressed through costs.

The Court also considered Mool Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 4046, and the respondent’s authorities, Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department v. Biswajit Choudhury, 2018 (4) GLT 642, and Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, concerning the requirement of sufficient cause and the limits of judicial discretion in condoning delay.

The Court assessed the applicant’s conduct and the explanation offered rather than treating the length of the delay as determinative.

Although the delay resulted from a change of counsel and the time taken to retrieve and examine the case records, the Court found that the explanation was sufficient and did not indicate mala fides or a deliberate attempt to prolong the proceedings.

Applying the liberal but balanced approach in N. Balakrishnan, the Court concluded that refusing condonation would prevent the applicant from pursuing the appeal on merits, while any prejudice to the respondent could be compensated by imposing costs.

The condonation was made conditional upon payment of ₹2,000 as costs to the respondent on or before the date the appeal was listed for admission, with proof of payment to be filed.

The Registry was directed to diarise the appeal and list it for admission after two weeks. The miscellaneous case was accordingly disposed of.