Delay in FIR and Advocate status no grounds for quashing where prima facie criminal allegations exist.

The applicant, an advocate (Accused No. 4), sought to quash an FIR and a subsequent discharge rejection order regarding charges under Sections 376(2)(n), 323, 504, 506(2), and 114 of the IPC.

The complainant alleged that the applicant assisted Accused No. 1 in a marriage registration and later, alongside other accused, physically assaulted her, used abusive language, and forcefully obtained her thumb impressions on documents.

The applicant contended that she was merely performing her professional duties as a lawyer and that the FIR was a retaliatory "pressure tactic" following a prior complaint filed by the father of Accused No. 1 regarding the illegal custody of his son.

1. Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose a prima facie case against the applicant for the alleged offenses.

2. Whether the delay in filing the FIR and the applicant’s professional role as an advocate warrant the quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

The court primarily applied the criteria for quashing an FIR established in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which permits quashment if allegations do not constitute an offense or are manifest with mala fides.

It also relied on Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh, which prohibits conducting a "mini-trial" during quashing or discharge stages.

Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which establishes that mere delay in lodging an FIR is not a sufficient solitary ground for quashing.

The court found that while a female accused cannot be attributed with the offense of rape under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the specific allegations of physical assault, verbal abuse, and criminal intimidation under Sections 323, 504, and 506(2) were clearly stated in the FIR.

The court reasoned that the applicant’s defense—that she was only performing professional duties—requires a factual determination that cannot be settled without a full trial.

Furthermore, the court held that the two-month delay in filing the FIR was insufficient to negate the specific roles attributed to the applicant at this preliminary stage.

It quashed the FIR and consequential proceedings against the applicant specifically regarding Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, as the charge was legally inapplicable.

the court upheld the charges under Sections 323, 504, 506(2), and 114 of the IPC and affirmed the lower court's order rejecting the discharge application, noting that the veracity of the assault and intimidation claims must be tested during trial.