Delay was condoned to enable merits-based scrutiny of an allegedly unlawful appointment.

The petitioner challenged the order dated 17 September 2024 by which the Collector, Sheopur dismissed Appeal No. 17/Appeal/2020-21 as time-barred.

The appeal concerned the selection and appointment of private respondent No. 4, Girraj Sharma, as Gram Rojgar Sahayak, Gram Panchayat Bardhakhurd.

The petitioner asserted that he had obtained 58.67 marks and stood higher in the provisional merit list, whereas respondent No. 4 had obtained 53 marks.

The petitioner received relevant documents under the Right to Information Act on 11 May 2018 and filed the statutory appeal in September 2018, beyond the prescribed limitation period of 30 days.

He contended that the delay was only approximately three months and ought to have been condoned.

Limitation provisions are intended to prevent stale claims but generally do not destroy substantive rights where sufficient cause for delay is established.

Where the applicable statutory framework permits condonation of delay, the competent authority must examine the explanation for the entire period of delay and exercise its discretion judicially rather than reject the matter mechanically.

Relying on Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Court reiterated that a liberal and justice-oriented approach should ordinarily be adopted where refusal to condone delay may result in a potentially meritorious matter being rejected without adjudication on merits; however, condonation is not automatic and sufficient cause must still be shown.

The Collector had considered that the petitioner received documents under the RTI Act on 11 May 2018 and thereafter filed the appeal beyond the 30-day limitation period.

However, the High Court held that the relevant inquiry was not limited to the date of receipt of the documents.

The Collector was required to determine what documents were supplied, whether the impugned appointment order was communicated on that date, what knowledge the petitioner acquired, and whether his explanation adequately covered the period until filing of the appeal.

Since the dispute involved the legality of a public appointment and the petitioner claimed superior merit—58.67 marks as against respondent No. 4’s 53 marks—the Court considered it appropriate that the statutory appeal be examined on merits rather than being rejected solely on limitation.

Questions concerning the petitioner’s entitlement, the operation of any preference for candidates belonging to the concerned Gram Panchayat, and the conformity of respondent No. 4’s appointment with the applicable recruitment policy were left to the Collector.

The High Court set aside the Collector’s order dated 17 September 2024 insofar as it rejected the appeal on the ground of delay and condoned the delay in filing the statutory appeal.

The Collector, Sheopur was directed to hear the petitioner, respondent No. 4, and all other necessary parties and decide Appeal No. 17/2020-21 on its own merits through a reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with law and the applicable recruitment policy, preferably within three months from receipt of the certified copy of the judgment.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not decided the merits of the petitioner’s claim or the legality of respondent No. 4’s appointment.

No order was made as to costs.