Delayed IPR filing cannot independently disqualify an employee from promotion absent an applicable rule.

The applicant, an Executive Engineer (Civil), was within the zone of consideration for promotion to Superintending Engineer (Civil).

A DDA circular dated 24 December 2024 required filing the 2024 Immovable Property Return (IPR) by 31 January 2025 and specified denial of vigilance clearance and disciplinary action for non-filing or delay, but did not mention withholding promotion.

The applicant filed the IPR on 29 December 2025, two days before the DPC met. The DPC nevertheless assessed him as “unfit” for promotion because of the late filing; his juniors were promoted.

The applicant challenged that decision, the promotion order dated 6 February 2026 insofar as it excluded him, and the rejection of his request for condonation. The Tribunal rejected DDA’s non-joinder objection and allowed the application in part.

1. Whether delayed submission of the 2024 IPR, by itself, could lawfully be treated as a ground to declare the applicant unfit for promotion, where the applicable circular did not prescribe that consequence.

2. Whether the subsequent circular of 30 January 2026 could be applied to the applicant’s 2024 IPR or otherwise authorise the DPC’s finding of unfitness.

3. Whether the applicant’s exclusion could be sustained by reasons beyond the ground communicated to him, and whether the promoted officers’ non-joinder barred the challenge.

Under paragraph 5 of DDA’s circular dated 24 December 2024, late or non-filing of an IPR attracted denial of vigilance clearance and disciplinary action under Regulation 16 of the DDA Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations, 1999; the circular did not prescribe promotion denial or a finding of unfitness.

The Tribunal held that an administrative authority cannot create an additional promotional disqualification absent authority in the applicable rules or instructions, and that a DPC’s discretion to assess suitability remains bounded by that framework.

The later circular dated 30 January 2026 could not operate retrospectively, and withholding promotion could not automatically be equated with a finding of unfitness.

Applying *Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner*, (1978) 1 SCC 405, the Tribunal held that an administrative decision must be assessed on the reasons stated when it was made and cannot be sustained by subsequently adding new reasons.

It also relied on *Avinash Kumar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh* (Chhattisgarh High Court, 9 February 2018), concerning the distinction between an obligation to file property returns and a legally prescribed bar to promotion.

The 2024 circular governed the applicant’s return and did not make late filing a promotional disqualification; the 2026 circular related to a later IPR cycle and could not supply that missing authority retrospectively.

Further, the IPR was available before the DPC met, and DDA identified no adverse contents in the return, adverse vigilance material, pending disciplinary proceeding, or other independent basis for finding the applicant unsuitable.

The communicated reason was specifically “unfit due to late submission of IPR”; DDA could not later defend the decision by generally referring to other DPC materials without identifying an independent adverse ground.

The warning letter was not a penalty or an independent promotional bar, and the rejection of condonation could not itself create a disqualification absent from the governing instructions.

The Tribunal also noted that DDA had not satisfactorily explained why other employees who had filed IPRs late were promoted, while clarifying that equality did not require repetition of an illegality.

It set aside the promotion order dated 6 February 2026 to the extent that the applicant was denied consideration or promotion solely because of delayed filing of the 2024 IPR, and held that the 18 February 2026 “unfit” decision could not stand on that basis.

DDA was directed to reconsider the applicant’s suitability under the applicable Recruitment Regulations, without treating the delay as, by itself, a disqualification and without retrospectively applying the later circular.

If found fit, he is to be promoted from the date his immediate junior was promoted, with consequential seniority and other benefits admissible under the rules.

The exercise must be completed within eight weeks of receipt of the order; there was no order as to costs.