Delhi HC Leaves Eviction Order In Place After Tenant Filed Wife’s Ownership Papers With Written Submissions, Without Seeking Leave

The petitioner challenged an order of the Additional Rent Controller dismissing his application for leave to defend and directing eviction from one ground-floor room in property No. 5271, Bharat Nagar, Shora Kothi, Paharganj, Delhi.

Before the Controller, the petitioner sought to rely on a registered General Power of Attorney, a registered Will, an Agreement to Sell, and other documents to dispute the landlord–tenant relationship.

Although the Controller had granted time to file additional documents, the petitioner did not file them within that period or apply for leave to file them later; he tendered them with written submissions.

The Controller declined to take them on record, and the petitioner brought this revision under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Whether the Controller committed an illegality warranting revisional interference by refusing to take documents on record when they were tendered with written submissions, without an application seeking leave for their belated production.

Whether the petitioner’s explanation that counsel’s personal circumstances caused the delay justified interference with the Controller’s order.

Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 confers supervisory and revisional, not appellate, jurisdiction on the High Court; the Court examines the legality and propriety of the decision-making process and does not substitute its view merely because another view is possible.

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, support this restricted scope of review.

Under Section 25-B, a defence in the summary eviction procedure is to be raised with the Court’s leave and by affidavit; documents tendered with written submissions do not, by themselves, satisfy that procedural requirement.

A litigant should not ordinarily suffer for a genuine mistake of counsel, but that principle does not automatically excuse non-compliance; its application depends on the circumstances and the explanation provided.

The Controller had specifically granted the petitioner four weeks to file additional documents, but no documents or application were filed within that period.

The documents were later tendered with written submissions, without a formal request for leave or a specific, cogent explanation for the delay; the principal documents also pre-dated the leave-to-defend application.

The petitioner’s general assertion about counsel’s personal circumstances did not establish that the failure to comply was unavoidable.

In these circumstances, the Controller’s refusal to consider the documents was not a material illegality or irregularity in the decision-making process.

The High Court did not determine the documents’ genuineness or evidentiary effect.

Finding no merit in the revision, it dismissed the petition and disposed of any pending applications.