Delhi HC Orders Tailor’s Release After 7½ Years, Says School Records Didn’t Prove Survivor Was Under 18; Rape Conviction Stands

The appellant, a tailor, was accused of taking the prosecutrix from his shop on the pretext of trying her stitched suit, taking her to an isolated location and raping her, then threatening her not to disclose the incident.

The prosecution alleged that she was a minor.

The Trial Court convicted him under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Sections 366, 376(2) and 506 Part II IPC, sentencing him to 15 years’ imprisonment under Section 376(2) IPC and imposing other concurrent sentences.

In appeal, the appellant challenged the prosecutrix’s credibility, proof of her age and the sentence; he also relied on discrepancies in the date and surrounding circumstances, the absence of independent corroboration and the medical evidence.

Under Sections 34(2) of the POCSO Act and 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, age must be determined by applying the statutory evidentiary hierarchy; school records or a certificate repeating an unsupported admission-register entry do not, without proof of their source, necessarily establish age.

The prosecution bears the burden of proving minority beyond reasonable doubt.

A credible prosecutrix’s testimony may sustain a conviction without independent corroboration; absence of injuries or other corroborative evidence is not, by itself, decisive.

Section 376(2) IPC requires proof of an applicable aggravated circumstance; where the proved facts establish rape but not the charged aggravator, conviction may be altered to the lesser offence under Section 376(1) IPC, subject to Sections 222(1) and 386(b) CrPC.

Section 366 IPC covers abduction by force or deceitful means for the purpose of rape, while sentencing requires consideration of both the offence and the offender, including the principles discussed in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, and Khem Chand v. State of Delhi, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1611.

The Court found that the school admission form, register and principal’s certificate did not establish the source of the recorded date of birth. No qualifying birth certificate or medical age determination was produced, although the father testified that a Municipal Corporation birth certificate had been obtained. The prosecution therefore failed to prove minority beyond reasonable doubt, requiring the POCSO conviction to be set aside.

The Court nevertheless accepted PW-1’s direct account of forcible intercourse and identification of the appellant. It held that the date discrepancy, estimated travel time, absence of CCTV or independent eyewitnesses, PW-6’s evidence and lack of external injuries did not displace her account; the medical record, including tears, was not inconsistent with it.

Because the only potentially applicable Section 376(2) circumstance depended on the prosecutrix being under 16, which was not proved, the aggravated conviction could not stand; the established rape conviction was altered to Section 376(1) IPC.

The Court upheld Section 366 on the finding that the appellant deceitfully induced the prosecutrix to accompany him for a purpose connected with her suit and took her to the place where the rape occurred; it also affirmed Section 506 Part II based on her evidence of the subsequent threat.

In sentencing under Section 376(1), the Court applied the seven-year minimum in force on the date of the offence, excluded the later higher minimum under Article 20(1), and considered the appellant’s clean antecedents, age and custody already served alongside the offence’s gravity and impact.

The convictions and sentences under Sections 366 and 506 Part II IPC, including the fines and default terms, were affirmed; substantive sentences were to run concurrently.

The appellant was to receive set-off under Section 428 CrPC and be released forthwith if not required in another case.