Delhi HC Upholds Conviction For Assaulting 8-Year-Old Boy Twice, Cuts POCSO Sentence From 25 Years To 10

The appellant was convicted under Sections 377 and 506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act for allegedly committing penetrative sexual assault on a boy under twelve on two occasions and threatening to kill the child’s mother if he disclosed the incidents.

The Trial Court relied principally on the child’s testimony, the school record proving his age, and the evidence concerning the subsequent disclosure; it imposed 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6, with concurrent sentences for criminal intimidation, and awarded ₹7,50,000 compensation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reliability of the child’s testimony, citing inconsistencies about the incidents, their location and disclosure, the absence of independent witnesses, and the medical findings.

The appeal also raised the sentence’s proportionality and the applicability of the pre- or post-amendment version of Section 6.

The Court applied Sections 5(l), 5(m), 6 and 29 of the POCSO Act: the prosecution must first prove foundational facts before the statutory presumption operates; aggravated penetrative sexual assault committed more than once and against a child below twelve attracts Sections 5(l) and 5(m), punishable under Section 6.

A child’s testimony may alone sustain conviction if it is reliable and inspires confidence; corroboration is a matter of prudence, not an absolute requirement (*Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka*, (2001) 9 SCC 129; *State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh*, (2025) 8 SCC 545).

Normal discrepancies do not discredit testimony, while material discrepancies are those not reasonably expected in the circumstances (*State of Rajasthan v. Kalki*, (1981) 2 SCC 752).

Sections 134 and 114(g) of the Evidence Act address witness numbers and adverse inferences from withheld evidence.

The unamended Section 6 prescribed a minimum of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment; the 2019 enhanced minimum does not apply to pre-amendment offences (*State of U.P. v. Sonu Kushwaha*, (2023) 7 SCC 475).

Section 42 of the POCSO Act governed the absence of a separate sentence under Section 377 IPC.

The Court found the child’s age established by consistent school records and his account reliable on the appellant’s identity, the penetrative acts, their repetition and the threat.

It treated the uncertainty about dates, the room or staircase, and the sequence of family disclosure as non-fatal discrepancies, and held that the mother’s questioning, the child’s signature on his complaint, and the non-examination of other potential witnesses did not establish tutoring or undermine the child’s direct testimony.

The medical evidence—no recent injury, but penetration not ruled out—did not contradict the child’s account, particularly given the time elapsed before examination.

The Court therefore found the foundational facts proved, activated Section 29, and held that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption.

For sentence, the incidents predated the 2019 amendment, so the unamended Section 6 applied; considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Court reduced the 25-year term to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.

The ₹10,000 fine and default sentence under Section 6, the 18-month sentence and fine for Section 506 IPC, concurrent running of substantive sentences, compensation award, and set-off entitlement remained unchanged; no separate sentence was imposed under Section 377 IPC.

The pending application was disposed of.