01Facts
The respondent sued for possession of the Second Floor of property No. 380, Part-IV, Bagh Kare Khan, Kishan Ganj, Delhi, and for a permanent injunction. She claimed title under a registered sale deed dated 15 February 2008, following a chain of transfers originating with Smt. Motia Devi and including a relinquishment deed executed in favour of Sukhdev Vaid.
pp. 2–8The appellant claimed an undivided share as the grandson of Motia Devi, disputed the alleged Will and the respondent’s title, and asserted that the Second Floor and staircase were outside the sale deed. The appellant and his father had previously brought a suit challenging the respondent’s sale deed; that suit was dismissed on 30 January 2020. The District Judge decreed possession and granted the injunction, prompting this appeal under Section 96 CPC.
pp. 2–8, 11–1202Issues
i.1. Whether the respondent established title to the suit property and was entitled to possession of the Second Floor.
pp. 6, 11–16ii.2. Whether the appellant established an independent or undivided share in the property sufficient to resist the claim for possession.
pp. 12–14iii.3. Whether the sale deed’s description of the property included the Second Floor and the staircase, notwithstanding the appellant’s contention that they related to Old Plot No. 164.
pp. 14–1503Law Applied
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a first appeal from an original decree. Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that, upon expiry of the prescribed period for instituting a suit for possession, a person’s right to the property is extinguished.
pp. 13–14The Court relied on Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 975, and Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, Civil Appeal No. 16899 of 1996, for the proposition that Section 27 is an exception to the general rule that limitation bars only the remedy, as it may extinguish the former owner’s title and crystallise a corresponding right in another.
pp. 13–14The Court also treated the dismissal of the appellant’s earlier suit challenging the sale deed, which had attained finality, as precluding a renewed challenge in the present proceedings.
p. 13Provisions in the judgment · 2 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 96
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 27
04Reasoning
The Court found that the respondent’s chain of title was supported by the registered sale deed and related transactions, and that the appellant’s cross-examination admissions supported the relationships and the execution of the relinquishment deed in favour of Sukhdev Vaid.
pp. 12–15The appellant produced no evidence establishing that Motia Devi died intestate, that the property remained undivided, or that he held a share; nor had he challenged the dismissal of his earlier suit attacking the respondent’s sale deed. The Court further held that the sale deed described the property as Municipal No. 18/380, comprising Old Plot Nos. 163 and 164, with the built-up structure and roof rights, and therefore rejected the contention that Old Plot No. 164 was excluded.
pp. 12–1505Holding
The High Court held that the respondent had established her title and entitlement to possession, while the appellant had failed to prove any independent right to retain the Second Floor.
pp. 15–16It dismissed the appeal, upheld the decree for possession and permanent injunction, and disposed of the pending applications.
pp. 15–16Original Court PDF
Sukant VaidvsSmt. Nirmla Singh
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