Aaryan International School’s ₹5 Lakh Trademark Decree Stands After Delhi HC Finds No Proof It Hired the Lawyer It Blamed for Its Absence

The Plaintiff sued for trademark infringement and obtained an ex parte decree on 25 October 2024, granting permanent injunction and awarding damages and costs of ₹5,00,000.

The Defendant admitted service of summons but claimed it had engaged an advocate who failed to appear or keep it informed.

It said it learned of the decree when a Local Commissioner visited its school premises and sought to set aside the decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, along with condonation of 196 days’ delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Plaintiff opposed the applications, disputing the alleged engagement and negligence and asserting that the Defendant had failed to monitor the proceedings.

Under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, an ex parte decree may be set aside if summons were not duly served or the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing; the proviso bars setting aside a decree merely for irregularity in service where the Defendant had notice of the hearing and sufficient time to appear.

“Sufficient cause” requires an explanation consistent with bona fides and diligence, assessed in the circumstances of the case (*Parimal v. Veena*, (2011) 3 SCC 545).

Although a litigant may, in appropriate circumstances, be protected from an advocate’s default, there is no absolute rule allowing a party to disown counsel; litigants also owe a duty to remain vigilant (*Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd.*, (1993) 2 SCC 185; *Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash*, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380).

The Court also relied on *A. Murugesan v. Jamuna Rani*, (2019) 20 SCC 803, regarding the requirement to establish sufficient cause for non-appearance under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation only where sufficient cause for the delay is shown.

The Defendant admitted service and did not claim it lacked sufficient time to appear.

Its explanation depended on an alleged advocate-client engagement, but it produced no vakalatnama, engagement letter, instructions, correspondence, or other contemporaneous evidence establishing that the advocate had been retained.

The Court further found that the Defendant had not shown diligence: the ex parte order was passed on 2 September 2024 and was available online, yet the Defendant neither sought to set it aside nor joined the proceedings before the decree was passed.

The claimed discovery of the decree through the Local Commissioner and the Chairperson’s husband’s arrest did not establish sufficient cause; the arrest occurred after the ex parte order, and the asserted lack of awareness was not credible given the availability of court orders online.

For the same reasons, and because the grounds for condonation were identical to those advanced under Order IX Rule 13, the Defendant failed to explain the delay.

It dismissed both applications—IA 12420/2025 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and IA 12419/2025 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act—leaving the ex parte judgment and decree in force.