Delhi High Court refers online IP jurisdiction questions to Larger Bench amid conflicting rulings on territorial jurisdiction

Hindustan Unilever Limited (“HUL”) instituted a commercial suit seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction restraining Kwick Living (I) Private Limited (“Kwick Living”) from broadcasting, publishing, hosting or communicating to the public its “War on What’s Hidden” advertising campaign, which allegedly disparaged HUL’s products sold under the marks “Vim” and “Surf Excel”.

The campaign was allegedly disseminated through billboards, social-media platforms, YouTube, Instagram and Kwick Living’s website, which also offered its competing products for sale.

Summons were issued on 19 August 2026. Kwick Living raised a preliminary objection that the Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction, contending that both parties had their registered offices in Mumbai and that HUL had specifically pleaded only a confirmed hoarding in Mumbai.

HUL relied on the accessibility and commercial functionality of Kwick Living’s online platforms in Delhi, the availability of its products for sale in Delhi, and HUL’s corporate office in Delhi to invoke Sections 20(c) CPC, 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957.

The Court confined its consideration to territorial jurisdiction and reserved judgment on that issue.

Whether intellectual-property suits are governed solely by Section 20 CPC, by Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, or by Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957, or by an interplay of these provisions.

Whether a corporate plaintiff must institute an intellectual-property suit only at the place of its principal or registered office when part of the cause of action has arisen there.

What jurisdictional rule should govern online transactions and digital dissemination in intellectual-property disputes, particularly in light of the approaches in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy , World Wrestling Entertainment , and Kohinoor Seed Fields India (P) Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences (P) Ltd. .

Section 20(c) CPC confers jurisdiction where the cause of action arises wholly or in part, while its Explanation deems a corporation to carry on business at its principal office and, for a cause of action arising at a place where it has a subordinate office, at that place also.

Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act provide an additional forum at the place where the plaintiff resides, carries on business or personally works for gain, notwithstanding the CPC.

In Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia , (2015) 10 SCC 161, the Supreme Court adopted a purposive restriction: where the plaintiff’s principal office and part of the cause of action are at the same place, the plaintiff cannot select a distant subordinate-office forum merely because it also carries on business there.

Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey organised the possible combinations of principal office, subordinate office and cause of action.

Banyan Tree held that mere accessibility of a website is insufficient under Section 20(c); purposeful availment, specific targeting and, where relevant, forum-specific injury must be shown.

Conversely, World Wrestling Entertainment and Kohinoor Seed Fields adopted a broader approach to “carrying on business” through an interactive e-commerce website, treating the capability to conclude commercial transactions as potentially sufficient.

Burger King treated Sections 134 and 62 as additional to Section 20 and regarded use of a trade mark in advertising and promotion as a possible cause of action where such use occurs.

The Court found that the authorities disclosed two unresolved conflicts.

First, Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction restricted the plaintiff’s choice where the principal-office location was also a place where the cause of action arose, whereas Burger King , Astral Ltd. , Rukhmani Keshwani and ITC Ltd. supported concurrent jurisdiction where substantive elements of the cause of action arose elsewhere.

Second, Banyan Tree required purposeful targeting and commercial activity or injury in the forum, while Nilesh Girkar treated nationwide digital communication and local accessibility as sufficient to constitute part of the cause of action under Section 20(c); Kohinoor Seed Fields further treated transactional capability as sufficient to establish carrying on business.

Applying these authorities to the pleaded facts—digital dissemination accessible in Delhi, an allegedly transactional website, asserted commercial impact in Delhi, and HUL’s Mumbai registered office and Delhi corporate office—the Court concluded that the governing principles were materially uncertain and that the issue required authoritative clarification by a Larger Bench.

It held that the interaction between Sections 20 CPC, 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and 62(2) of the Copyright Act, the effect of the principal-office rule in Sanjay Dalia , and the jurisdictional consequences of online commercial activity raised substantial and recurring questions of law.

The Court accordingly referred three questions concerning the applicable jurisdictional framework, the effect of the plaintiff’s principal office, and online transactions in IP disputes to a Larger Bench, directed the Registry to place the judgment before the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriately constituted Bench, and directed that the needful be done within one week.