Delhi High Court upholds bail to Chitra Ramakrishna and Sanjay Pandey in NSE phone-tapping case; says ED bail ruling was relevant but not binding in CBI proceedings

The CBI registered RC No. 2212022E0030 concerning the alleged unauthorised interception, recording and examination of telephone calls of NSE employees through iSEC Services Pvt. Ltd., engaged by NSE under work orders described as “Periodic Study of Cyber Vulnerabilities” between 2009 and 2017.

Sanjay Pandey, formerly associated with iSEC, was alleged to have continued controlling its affairs, while Chitra Ramakrishna, a senior NSE functionary, was alleged to have approved and facilitated the arrangement.

The CBI alleged that call data was copied, examined and transcribed without lawful authorisation and that NSE paid approximately ₹4.54 crores to iSEC.

Both respondents were arrested by the CBI in September 2022.

On 21 December 2022, the Special Judge granted them regular bail, substantially relying on the High Court’s earlier order dated 8 December 2022 granting Sanjay Pandey bail in connected ED/PMLA proceedings arising from the same factual transaction.

The CBI challenged both bail orders under Section 482 CrPC read with Article 227 of the Constitution, contending that the Special Judge had failed to independently assess the CBI’s case, the investigation material and the respondents’ respective roles.

Whether the Special Judge’s consideration of the earlier PMLA bail judgment arising from the same FIR and factual foundation amounted to abdication of jurisdiction or an impermissible substitution of the PMLA court’s prima facie assessment for an independent decision in the CBI proceedings.

Whether the bail orders were perverse, illegal, materially irregular or vitiated by non-application of mind because the Special Judge allegedly failed to consider the CBI’s allegations, investigation material and the distinct roles attributed to the respondents.

Whether the subsequent filing of the charge-sheet, including alteration or addition of penal provisions, justified setting aside the bail orders passed on 21 December 2022.

The Court applied the distinction between setting aside an original bail order and cancelling bail on account of subsequent misconduct or supervening circumstances.

Under Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., Y v. State of Rajasthan, Meena Devi v. State of U.P. and Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi), a superior court may interfere with a bail order where the discretion is perverse, illegal, arbitrary, founded on irrelevant considerations, or rendered without considering material circumstances; however, it cannot conduct a threadbare evaluation of the evidence or merely substitute its own view.

A bail order in connected proceedings is relevant but not conclusive: P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement holds that precedent in another case cannot by itself determine the grant or refusal of bail, while Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana requires individual consideration of the accused’s role and prohibits mechanical application of parity.

The Court also considered Section 45 of the PMLA, the regular-bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, Section 482 CrPC, Article 227 of the Constitution, and the principle recognised in Arvind Kejriwal v. CBI that bail granted in connected PMLA proceedings may be a relevant circumstance in a CBI case arising from the same factual foundation.

The Court held that the CBI and ED proceedings were legally distinct and that the PMLA judgment did not bind the CBI or confer immunity upon the respondents.

Nevertheless, because both proceedings arose from the same FIR, NSE–iSEC arrangement and alleged interception of telephone calls, the earlier PMLA judgment was a relevant circumstance that the Special Judge was entitled to consider.

In Sanjay Pandey’s case, the Special Judge recorded the CBI’s objections, identified the common factual and legal foundation, noted the prima facie nature of the earlier findings, considered the stringent requirements of Section 45 PMLA and observed that the remaining offences were bailable.

The order therefore was not a mechanical adoption of the earlier judgment.

In Chitra Ramakrishna’s case, although she had not yet received bail in the ED proceedings and her role was alleged to be different, the Special Judge expressly recorded the allegation that she had approved or processed the relevant work orders in her senior NSE positions and considered the alleged wrongful gain and loss.

Reliance on the earlier judgment concerned the common ingredients of the alleged offences and did not amount to treating her role as identical to Pandey’s.

The Court further held that the later charge-sheet could not retrospectively make the bail orders perverse; their legality had to be assessed on the material available when the orders were passed.

The CBI failed to identify any material circumstance that had been ignored or any perversity, illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of discretion.

It held that the earlier PMLA bail judgment was relevant but not binding, and that the Special Judge had independently applied the applicable bail principles, considered the CBI’s objections and addressed the respondents’ respective roles.

The subsequent charge-sheet did not justify retrospective interference.

Pending applications were disposed of, interim orders, if any, were vacated, and the Trial Court was directed to proceed uninfluenced by the prima facie observations in the bail orders, the earlier PMLA judgment or the present judgment.