Desertion cannot be established where the statutory two-year separation period had not elapsed.

The parties married on 09.03.2015 according to Hindu rites and had a male child on 09.02.2016.

The appellant-husband filed Matrimonial Case No. 64 of 2017 under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion.

The Principal Judge, Family Court, Purnea dismissed the divorce petition by judgment and decree dated 08.09.2025.

The husband preferred the present appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The appeal was considered at the stage of admission under Order XLI Rule 11 CPC.

Whether the findings of the Family Court rejecting the appellant’s allegations of cruelty—including physical assault, abusive conduct, insistence on separate residence, false criminal cases, and newspaper publication—were perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference?

Whether the allegation of adultery was sufficiently pleaded and proved under Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

Whether the respondent had deserted the appellant for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding presentation of the divorce petition, as required by Section 13(1)(ib) of the Act?

Whether alleged irretrievable breakdown of marriage justified dissolution of marriage in the absence of proof of a statutory ground under Section 13 of the Act?

Whether the appeal disclosed sufficient grounds for admission and interference under Order XLI Rule 11 CPC?

The Court applied Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, governing appeals from judgments of Family Courts, and Order XLI Rule 11 CPC, which permits dismissal of an appeal at the preliminary stage where it does not merit admission, subject to a reasoned consideration of the grounds raised.

Under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, cruelty and desertion must be established by reliable evidence; desertion requires both factum of separation and the intention to permanently terminate cohabitation, and must continue for at least two years immediately preceding presentation of the petition.

Section 13(1)(i) requires proof of voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than the spouse after marriage, and allegations of adultery must be pleaded with material particulars and proved by cogent evidence.

The Court also relied on Mahender Pal Chabra & Anr. v. Subhash Aggrawal, Civil Appeal No. 1426 of 2024, decided on 30.01.2024, for the principle that although an appeal may be dismissed without notice under Order XLI Rule 11 CPC, the order must demonstrate application of mind and cannot be cryptic or non-speaking.

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage, by itself, is not a statutory ground available to a Family Court for granting divorce under Section 13 of the Act.

The Court found no perversity in the Family Court’s assessment of cruelty. The appellant’s own admissions regarding the parties’ premarital relationship, the financial transfer by the respondent’s father, her employment and MBA studies with his consent, and her treatment at the appellant’s parents’ nursing home weakened the allegations of coercion and persistent cruelty.

The testimony of PW-1 was unreliable because he had left the appellant’s father’s employment before the marriage, lacked personal knowledge, and introduced allegations not pleaded in the petition.

The alleged physical assault was treated as an isolated and insufficiently pleaded incident, unsupported by evidence of a continuing pattern of cruelty.

The criminal cases could not be characterised as false merely because the appellant disputed them; charge-sheets had been submitted, cognizance had been taken, and there was no conclusive finding of falsity or quashing of the proceedings.

The newspaper report also did not establish cruelty because there was no proof that the respondent had caused its publication.

The adultery claim failed because the appellant did not identify the alleged paramour, or specify the time, place, occasion, or act of sexual intercourse.

The desertion claim was legally untenable because the respondent allegedly left on 04.12.2016, whereas the divorce petition was filed on 19.04.2017—well before completion of the statutory two-year period.

Further, her assertion that she left because of cruelty and remained willing to resume cohabitation negated the necessary intention to permanently abandon the marriage.

The plea of irretrievable breakdown could not independently support divorce, and the subsequent mediation proceedings did not establish any matrimonial offence or justify interference.

The Family Court’s findings were based on the evidence and disclosed no perversity, misapplication of law, or disregard of material evidence.

The appeal was therefore dismissed at the threshold under Order XLI Rule 11 CPC, and the judgment and decree dated 08.09.2025 in Matrimonial Case No. 64 of 2017 were affirmed.

There was no order as to costs, and the Registry was directed to communicate the order to the respondent within one week.