Detention Order Based Solely on Past Convictions Already Served Violates Right to Personal Liberty.

The petitioner, Rohit Das, was previously convicted in two separate cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), 1881: Crime No. 161/2021 (convicted for 33 days) and Crime No. 55/2022 (convicted for 7 months).

Having served both sentences, no further criminal cases were registered against him.

On April 23, 2026, the Respondent No. 2 (Detaining Authority) issued an order under Section 3(1) and Section 10 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, directing the petitioner's preventive detention for three months based on his past involvement and an Istagasa report from the Superintendent of Police.

The petitioner challenged this order via a writ of habeas corpus/certiorari, alleging a violation of fundamental rights.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India regarding the High Court's discretionary power to issue writs.

The principles governing the power of arrest and detention established by the Supreme Court in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997), which mandates that any deprivation of liberty must be justified by reasonable satisfaction and strict adherence to procedural guidelines.

The power to arrest is distinct from the justification for its exercise, a principle posited in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.

The protection of individual liberties against state excess as emphasized in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa.

The Court scrutinized the justification for the detention order, noting that while the petitioner had a criminal record, he had already served the court-imposed sentences and paid the relevant fines for his prior NDPS offenses.

The Court observed that the Detaining Authority failed to sufficiently consider the petitioner’s reply to the show-cause notice and lacked fresh material evidence to prove that the petitioner was currently engaged in illicit traffic.

By referencing the D.K. Basu guidelines, the Court emphasized that "denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter" and requires balancing individual rights against societal needs.

The Court reasoned that since the petitioner had already been punished for his past acts, detaining him again for three months for the same historical conduct, without valid evidence of ongoing criminal activity, constituted an improper exercise of discretionary jurisdiction.

The Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned order dated April 23, 2026, passed by Respondent No. 2.

The petitioner was ordered to be released forthwith, provided he was not required in any other case, though his claim for monetary compensation was denied.