### DETENTION ORDER QUASHED FOR FAILURE TO ESTABLISH DISTURBANCE TO PUBLIC ORDER BEYOND ORDINARY LAW VIOLATIONS

The petitioner’s husband, Arjun @ Ajay, was preventively detained by an order dated 19.01.2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Surat City.

The authority classified the detenue as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), based on two criminal cases registered against him under Sections 318(4) and 54 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) on 07.10.2025.

The petitioner challenged the legality of the detention, arguing that the offences involved did not disturb "public order" and that the detaining authority acted mechanically without sufficient material.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law based on the provided material.

2. Whether the activities of the detenue, premised on two criminal cases where bail had already been granted, meet the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts to commit specified offences under the IPC (now BNS) or Arms Act.

The court relied on the Supreme Court precedent in Dhaya M. v. State of Kerala and others (2025), which dictates that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and is an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution.

The principles from Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana were cited to emphasize that ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) should be exhausted before resorting to preventive detention, and that detention cannot be used merely to circumvent bail orders.

The court found that the detaining authority failed to establish a nexus between the detenue's alleged criminal activities and a breach of "public order".

While the detenue was involved in two cases under the BNS, the court noted that he had already been granted bail by the competent court.

Following the Supreme Court’s rationale in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, the bench reasoned that the law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed; it should not be used to "clip the wings" of an accused when the state could have instead moved for the cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal procedure.

The court determined that the subjective satisfaction of the authority was flawed as there was no material evidence to show that public peace or tranquility was adversely affected.

It held that the material on record was insufficient to justify the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

The Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute.