Different handwriting or ink does not invalidate a promissory note where execution is admitted.

The Respondent instituted a recovery suit alleging that Appellant No. 1 borrowed ₹50,000 each on 09.11.1994 and 05.01.1995 and executed two promissory notes, Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PW-1/B, witnessed by Appellant No. 2.

The Appellants disputed the transactions and contended that they had handed over signed blank promissory notes to one Swaraj Kapoor in connection with a separate loan, which were later procured and misused by the Respondent.

The Trial Court rejected the plea of forgery and held the promissory notes to be genuine and valid.

Although the appeal originally challenged several findings, the Appellants confined the challenge to Issue No. 2 concerning the genuineness and validity of the two promissory notes.

Whether the promissory notes dated 09.11.1994 and 05.01.1995, Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PW-1/B, were forged, fabricated, or otherwise invalid.

Whether the Trial Court’s finding that the promissory notes were genuine and valid suffered from perversity, illegality, or material misappreciation of evidence warranting interference under Section 96 CPC.

The Court applied Section 96 CPC, under which a first appellate court may reconsider questions of fact and law but ordinarily should defer to findings based on proper appreciation of evidence unless they are perverse, legally erroneous, or unsupported by the record.

Relying on Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, Madhukar v. Sangram, H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, and Malluru Mallappa v. Kuruvathappa, the Court reiterated the duties of a first appellate court under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC.

Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises presumptions regarding consideration and due execution of a negotiable instrument, subject to rebuttal by the defendant.

Under Section 114, Illustration (g), of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court may draw an adverse inference where a party withholds material evidence that could reasonably be expected to be produced, as explained in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif.

The principle in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar was applied that filling in particulars by a person other than the executant does not, by itself, invalidate a negotiable instrument where execution is admitted.

Section 34 of the Evidence Act recognises the relevance of books of account but provides that such entries alone are insufficient to impose liability; consequently, absence of account entries is not invariably fatal to a claim otherwise supported by evidence.

The Appellants admitted that the signatures of Appellant No. 1 and Appellant No. 2 appeared on the promissory notes; their case was therefore one of signed blank instruments and subsequent misuse, rather than complete denial of execution.

The Court held that the burden of proving this specific defence lay on the Appellants.

They failed to examine Swaraj Kapoor, who was the central witness to the alleged original transaction, and Appellant No. 2, an attesting witness whose evidence could have supported the plea of blank signing and misuse; this justified an adverse inference under Section 114, Illustration (g).

Differences in handwriting, ink, or language between the documents did not establish forgery or interpolation, particularly because the notes were executed on different dates and the signatures were admitted.

The Respondent’s failure to produce account books or reply to the legal notice was treated as relevant but non-conclusive and insufficient to displace the admitted execution and statutory presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act.

The adverse finding regarding the cheque under Issue No. 3 did not automatically invalidate the promissory-note transactions, which were supported by separate evidence.

On the totality of circumstances, the Appellants’ explanation was found improbable and unsubstantiated.

The Trial Court’s finding on Issue No. 2 was neither perverse nor illegal and did not involve material misappreciation of evidence.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, the impugned judgment and decree were affirmed to the extent challenged, pending applications were disposed of, and there was no order as to costs.